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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine the development of the Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS) from 1959 to 1965 and to show that Tom Hayden was the 
most effective figure in navigating the organization during this era.  SDS was founded 
in 1959 and from 1959 to 1965 the main inner problem of the organization was to 
determine its vision and direction.  The Port Huron Statement issued in 1962 was the 
first turning point in this aim.  The writer of the Port Huron Statement was Tom 
Hayden.  His main line of vision was to create an activist student movement 
throughout the country that would make social reform using the tactics of southern 
movement that was pursued by the black protestors.  It is argued in the thesis that 
Hayden embraced the task of being the catalyst of southern civil rights movement and 
the activist students in the North and played an important role in shaping the vision 
and direction of SDS and in widening the organization’s influence.  With the 
Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP), SDS fully followed the vision of 
Hayden.  The models of community organizing, direct activism, and participatory 
democracy became the main terms in defining the organization’s vision.  In giving the 
account of this period, the documents in SDS Microfilm Collection that has been 
located at the Library University of Wisconsin were used.  Most of the written 
discussions made by the members of the organization exist in this collection. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
Bu tezin amacı Demokratik bir Toplum için Öğrenciler adlı organizasyonun 1959 
yılından 1965 yılına kadar olan gelişme sürecini incelemek ve Tom Hayden’in bu 
dönemde organizasyonu yönlendiren en etkili kişi olduğunu göstermektir.  
Demokratik bir Toplum için Öğrenciler 1959 yılında kuruldu ve 1959’dan 1965’e 
kadar organizasyonun temel iç sorunu bir vizyon ve yönelim belirlemekti.  1962’de 
yayınlanan Port Huron Bildirisi bu amaç içerisinde bir dönüm noktasıdır.  Port Huron 
Bildirisi’nin yazarı Tom Hayden’dir.  Hayden’in vizyonunun ana çizgisi, tüm ülke 
çapında, siyah protestocular tarafından güneyde yürütülen hareketin taktiklerini 
uygulayarak sosyal reform yapmayı amaçlayan bir eylemci öğrenci hareketi 
yaratmaktı.  Tezde, Hayden’in güneydeki sivil haklar hareketi ile kuzeydeki eylemci 
öğrenciler arasında birleştirici rol üstlendiği ve Demokratik bir Toplum için 
Öğrenciler organizasyonunun vizyonunu ve yönelimini şekillendirmede ve bu 
organizasyonun etkisini genişletmede önemli bir rol oynadığı savunulmaktadır.  
Ekonomik Araştırma ve Aksiyon Projesi ile beraber, Demokratik bir Toplum için 
Öğrenciler organizasyonu tamamen Hayden’in vizyonunu takip etmeye başlamıştır.  
Hayden’in savunduğu komünal organizasyon, dolaysız eylemcilik ve katılımcı 
demokrasi modelleri, organizasyonun vizyonunu tanımlamada ana terimler haline 
gelmiştir.  Bahsedilen sürecin tümünü incelerken, Wisconsin Üniversitesi 
Kütüphanesi’nde bulunan Demokratik bir Toplum için Öğrenciler Mikrofilm 
Kolleksiyonu’na ait belgeler kullanılmıştır.  Organizasyon üyelerinin yürütmüş olduğu 
yazılı tartışmaların hemen hemen tümü bu kolleksiyon içerisinde yer almaktadır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was founded in 1959 by Al Haber 
as the youth chapter of the League for Industrial Democracy (LID) and continued 
its activities as a stable organization until 1969.  This thesis will examine the 
development of SDS during the era from 1959 to 1965.  There are two distinct 
terms within this era.  The term from 1959 to late 1962 was the fledgling period, in 
which the primary concerns of the organization were to define its vision and 
strategies, to achieve an organizational development, to recruit effective members, 
and to question the relationship with the LID.  The SDS National Convention held 
in Port Huron, Michigan in June 1962, marked the end of this fledgling period.  
The Port Huron Statement, mainly written by Tom Hayden, came into existence at 
this convention, and it more or less articulated the SDS vision.  As the discussions 
during the years about the direction and structure of SDS from 1963 to 1965 
proved, this vision was rather ambiguous, but it was sufficiently provocative to 
stimulate many students around the country.  With the circulation of the statement, 
SDS membership rapidly increased.  By 1966, forty-five thousand copies had been 
printed and the Port Huron Statement became the most popular document of the 
sixties.   
From 1962 to 1965, SDS went through a highly complicated and problematic 
period.  There is no doubt that SDS was developing rapidly, especially in the case 
of attendance and membership.  Wide appeal among the students resulted in the 
 2 
SDS becoming a mass movement by 1964.  By late 1963, however, disputes arose 
within the organization.  The main issue of the discussions was to redefine the 
vision and the direction of the organization.  One group argued that SDS should 
give up its original notion of educating affiliated students as its priority and should 
deal with more urgent problems such as poverty and racism.  This group proposed 
the Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP), which aimed to organize the 
poor whites and blacks under the common cause of poverty.  ERAP also intended 
for community organizing among these groups, which was thought to render them 
with significant political power and therefore to constitute the core structure of a 
participatory democratic decision-making system throughout the country.  ERAP 
soon dominated SDS and educational concerns ceased.  It even outmoded SDS 
when some of the organizers argued that ERAP should be an independent project 
cooperating with other sections of the society, such as liberals, civil rights 
movement organizations and poor adults, and should leave SDS on its own with its 
limited capability.  No actual disconnection occurred, but ERAP became a more 
important component of the movement than SDS.  In the end ERAP failed and by 
mid-1965, SDS activities became limited to peace issues.   
The period from 1962 to 1965 was problematic because SDS became an 
influential, widely recognized organization: It faced an enormous growth on one 
hand, but lost its central structure, its effective leadership and its serious social 
reform plans on the other hand.  During the period intense discussions were held 
within the organization, and crucial decisions that determined the future of the 
organization were taken.  This meant that growth brought with it a sudden change 
in direction.  The original strategy was to educate students—the professionals of 
the future—and to make them full time radicals.  This aimed at social reform from 
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within, which would emerge when those students took the key positions in the 
nation’s institutions.  This notion was replaced by a more populist, activist, and 
urgent one during this period.  The new notion proposed that SDS should be the 
catalyzing force within the current active movement.  It should take active 
participation within the cause of the civil rights movement. 
The thesis argues that SDS took the latter notion leaving behind the original 
one.  The main argument is that one figure was especially effective and had the 
decisive role in pulling SDS in this direction.  This figure was Tom Hayden, the 
second president of SDS, the “writer” of the Port Huron Statement, one of the 
initiators of ERAP, a community organizer, a profound admirer of the civil rights 
movement, and the “suppressor” of Michael Harrington—the LID chairman—and 
Al Haber—the founder and first president of SDS.  Within the thesis, two distinct 
factors that navigated SDS are defined.  One was the current wave of the 
movement, which is defined with the civil rights movement, peace issues, the 
mood of protest and activism and the impatient energies of the restless students.  
The other one was Tom Hayden as the dominant figure in SDS and as the 
organizer, defined with his vision, his talent of influencing people, and his passion.  
His vision was to take active participation, to make “a slogan into a reality, by 
making a decision into an action.”1  His vision explicitly arose from his impatience 
in trying to make a change with a deep commitment to activism.  His passion was 
outstanding: during his activist career, he willingly went to the jail, as he believed 
that “it was both a necessary moral act and a rite of passage into serious 
                                                 
1 Tom Hayden, Rebel: A Personal History of the 1960s (Los Angeles: Red Hen Press, 2003), 
p. 38. 
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commitment.”2  He was extremely talented in representing his ideas to the youth 
and influencing them.  While “at the height of his commitment to self-renunciatory 
leadership, he dominated SDS meetings and freely threw his weight around.”3   
Hayden’s radical vision was based on his influence from the civil rights 
movement and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).  His 
experiences with the black protestors in Berkeley and the Bay Area and in 
Mississippi in 1961 “established the tone of subsequent relations between SNCC 
and SDS.”4  The thesis tries to show that the two factors—the current wave of the 
movement and Tom Hayden—were in harmony; they were generally coinciding 
with each other.  The pattern proposed in the thesis is that the civil rights 
movement influenced Hayden deeply where on the other hand Hayden’s vision 
affected the student crowds.  Hayden perfectly took the role of the catalyst; he 
could spontaneously articulate the concerns of the students with a clear language 
and navigated them close to the civil rights movement and community organizing.  
He “advised northern radicals to support the southern struggle without hesitation,” 
while combining “an infatuation with SNCC’s revolutionary élan with a belief that 
all activists should move beyond civil rights reforms and join in a movement for a 
broad social change.”5  
The first chapter tells about the founding of SDS by Al Haber, his strategy 
in making SDS an effective organization, Hayden’s involvement in SDS and the 
early tendencies of vision within SDS.  Haber’s strategy was to organize meetings 
                                                 
2 Ibid., p.  64. 
3 James Miller, Democracy is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 271. 
4 Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 176.  
5 Ibid. 
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and conferences with the name of SDS in order to introduce the organization to as 
many people as possible.  In this, he also benefited from the appeal of the civil 
rights movement by inviting members from SNCC.  Haber was aware of the 
organizing skills of Hayden and he particularly struggled to recruit him.  Hayden 
on the other hand, was not interested in SDS as an educational organization.  This 
is proved by the fact that he tried firstly to be involved in the ranks of the National 
Student Association (NSA).  He came to SDS only after he was refused by NSA.  
With Hayden’s involvement, three different tendencies emerged within SDS.  
Hayden argued for a vision based on direct action, imitating the philosophy of 
SNCC and the civil rights movement, while Haber insisted on his original strategy 
of social reform from within.  The LID on the other hand proposed a program to 
improve democracy in urban areas. 
The second chapter firstly examines the Port Huron Convention—a turning 
point in the history of SDS—and Port Huron Statement and gives an account of the 
notion of participatory democracy.  It is shown that the Port Huron Statement was 
a mixture of the result of the earlier SDS studies on determining a vision and 
Hayden’s own additions.  In the statement’s vision, the key term was democracy 
and the aim was to improve democracy in America, to make it participatory.  The 
values were of secondary importance—or added only with provocative concerns.  
It is argued that the intellectual feedback had been taken from Alexis 
DeTocqueville’s account of democracy and was applied to G. Wright Mills’ 
depiction of American political structure.   
In the second chapter it is also argued that, along with the emergence of the 
Port Huron Statement, the convention was important for some other reasons.  The 
first one is that a dispute and an informal break with the LID occurred.  This 
 6 
dispute resulted with an implicit fight between Harrington and Hayden—a struggle 
between two egos on getting the leadership.  Consequently, Hayden outmoded 
Harrington from his symbolic leadership of the students and took over the position.  
Also, it is stressed that active participation in decision-making, a practice that was 
central to the notion of participatory democracy, was firstly experienced by the 
students at this convention.  The revision of the first draft of the Port Huron 
Statement was made with collective study.  An idea of having the Port Huron 
Statement as a living document was also came at this convention.   
The second chapter finally deals with the disputes expressed in the SDS 
Membership Bulletin in 1962 and 1963.  In giving an account of the discussions, 
Wini Breines’ categorization given in her book Community and Organization in 
the New Left, 1962-1968: The Great Refusal is implicitly taken into account.  
Breines argues that SDS was split into two distinct camps after Port Huron.  One 
group—including Hayden—pressed for what Breines calls as the “prefigurative 
politics” and the other—including Al Haber—defended the “strategic politics.”  
Breines gives the following definitions: 
The term prefigurative politics is used to designate an 
essentially anti-organizational politics characteristic of the 
movement, as well as parts of new left leadership, and may be 
recognized in counter institutions, demonstrations and the 
attempt to embody personal and anti-hierarchical values in 
politics.  Participatory democracy was central to prefigurative 
politics.”6 
……… 
Within and alongside the new left’s prefigurative impulse 
was what I have called strategic politics, which was committed 
to building organization in order to achieve major structural 
changes in the political, economic and social orders.  
                                                 
6 Wini Breines, Community and Organization in the New Left,1962-1968: The Great Refusal 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), p. 6. 
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Organization-building and strategic thinking were central to 
strategic politics.7 
 
The thesis gives the historical account of this split and again stresses 
Hayden’s and the civil rights movement’s roles in the result.  Significantly, it is 
shown that the “prefigurative politics” is not an appropriate category for the 
defenders of ERAP.  It is argued in the thesis that the motivations behind ERAP 
were not limited to community organizing, direct action, and to experiment with 
the notion of participatory democracy.  There was a clear strategic approach in 
initiating ERAP.  That was to prevent the rise of black nationalism, and the apathy 
among the poor whites.  The widening gap among poor whites and blacks was 
dangerous in the political sphere, which was undermining the efforts of the civil 
rights movement.  In this sense, ERAP also displayed the “strategic politics” to a 
degree.  Most of the members of SDS in 1963-65 period were defenders of ERAP 
and they possessed both strategic and prefigurative concerns.  Clearly many new 
members in SDS were far from dealing with the “strategic politics”, as they only 
had a temporary aspiration for direct action.  On the other hand, there were still 
those who defended that a “strategic politics” based on education should be the 
priority.  The two categories can be applied to these two camps.  But the dominant 
portion of SDS was the aforementioned third camp, which included the ERAP 
organizers and their followers and the crucial fact was not to display the 
“prefigurative politics”, but rather to display it as a counterpart of the civil rights 
movement. 
                                                 
7 Ibid., p. 7. 
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The third chapter firstly tells about initiating of ERAP, the intense 
discussions on its nature, and about how ERAP defenders became dominant in 
SDS.  When ERAP dominated SDS, a new direction was gained.  As ERAP 
proved to be a powerful force, some of the significant SDS members from the old 
guard proposed to have ERAP as an independent organization and project from 
SDS.  Many of them disconnected themselves from SDS informally and 
concentrated their energies on ERAP.  Some of the new members also disregarded 
SDS and involved directly in ERAP.  This caused emergence of a vacuum in SDS 
by means of leadership and structure and organizational capabilities.  Many 
chapters were localized and SDS lost its force as a central organization at the 
national level.  This change in the structure of the organization brought with it the 
question of to what degree SDS could be successful with a loose, decentralized 
organizational structure.  The vacuum was filled with incompetent new members, 
most of whom were intellectually insufficient, and therefore, the center completely 
lost its effectiveness.  As a result, with ERAP, both the structure and membership 
quality of SDS was changed.   
Cleary, Hayden was a defender of ERAP and he was among the old guard 
who left SDS.  The third chapter examines the Newark chapter of ERAP in which 
Hayden was involved.  This case study gives an insight about what ERAP 
accomplished and why it failed as a strategic project.  The problem of ERAP was 
not that it failed to reconcile the “strategic politics” with the “prefigurative 
politics”.  The failure of ERAP was rather that it proved to be insufficient to end 
racism and to prevent the rise of black nationalism that arose as a response to 
racism.  ERAP had been aimed to prevent SNCC from opposing the civil rights 
movement and resulted with the change of tactics among the blacks.  But The 
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Newark Riot marked that non-violent methods had already been given up and a 
new era had opened. 
Finally, it is pointed out from this context that the most important fact that 
diminished dramatically SDS and ERAP force as effective organizations was the 
collapse of the civil rights movement.  With the ERAP theorists and initiators, SDS 
was pulled deeply into the civil rights movement.  It became the counter-part of it 
in the North and disregarded other strategies and visions except the peace 
movement.  After 1965, when the civil rights movement left the stage, SDS had no 
other choice than to initiate Vietnam War protests.  Tom Hayden’s vision, which 
devotedly followed the philosophy of the civil rights movement, is a concrete 
particular example that helps to give an account of this process. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Early Period of SDS: 1959-61 
 
2.1- Al Haber and emergence of SDS 
 
Robert Alan Haber, the founder of SDS, who would later become the first 
president of SDS, was a quite different personality than Hayden.  His vision was 
based on a determined, but narrow struggle for a permanent social reform.  Unlike 
Hayden’s impatience, he was cautious, especially on the issue of using the energy.  
He sought for defining the priorities firstly, and then taking slow steps on the right 
way no matter how long it would take to achieve the goal.  He was the founder and 
the first president of SDS, but after Hayden’s involvement, his influence rapidly 
declined and his vision was marginalized within SDS.   
Haber was a prominent activist in the University of Michigan during the late 
1950s.  He was a member of the Political Issues Club, which was the most 
influential activist club in the university.  At the time, student radicalism in Ann 
Arbor was in progress and there was a rapid formation of a core group of young 
intelligentsia.  Meanwhile, Haber was seeking to take up his radicalism in a more 
coherent way.  His overwhelming influence upon affiliated students in Ann Arbor 
helped him to connect organic ties with LID and eventually to participate in SLID-
 11 
the youth chapter of LID.  As a rapidly growing student activism in Ann Arbor 
seemed to be a good opportunity for a stable LID organizing, both LID officers and 
Haber himself appreciated Haber’s involvement.  SLID was facing an obvious 
decline in many parts of the country while the active relation between “Haber and 
SLID headquarters in New York makes it plain that the Ann Arbor chapter was 
fast becoming an anomaly.”8  On other campuses where SLID chapters existed, 
efficiency was poor, besides, “the organization’s national convention in 1958 
attracted only thirteen students.  Yet the Michigan branch, thanks to the success of 
the Political Issues Club, began to thrive.  The reason was Al Haber.”9   
Thus, Haber’s position within SLID gradually became more influential and 
stable.  Remarkably, this was an effective factor for the development of SDS.  As 
an attempt to help SLID to survive, the name SLID was changed to SDS in June 
1959, a name which Haber thought to be remedial for SLID’s current decline.  Up 
to 1960 spring, SDS was not even an immature organization, but was only an 
attempt to revive SLID’s dismaying position.  Practically there were no new 
members or recruits other than Sharon Jeffrey, daughter of two “active socialists 
and veteran trade union organizers who worked for the United Auto Workers in 
Detroit.”10  But the presence of a written constitution that had came into force in 
June, 12-13, 1959, implied that SDS might have been thought to be a serious and 
independent project.  Article II of this constitution announced that SDS “shall be 
affiliated with the League For Industrial Democracy, and it shall function as the 
youth and student section of the League… and its principles and actions shall be 
consistent with the broad aims and principles of the League for Industrial 
                                                 
8 Miller, Democracy is in the Streets, p. 30. 
9 Ibid., p. 30. 
10 Ibid., p. 31. 
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Democracy.”11  While these determinations were to be expected in such a 
dependent and early stage, the same article also adds that “the Students For A 
Democratic Society shall be autonomously constituted.”12  However, the prospects 
for the future of this youth chapter of LID were dependent on the course of the 
movement’s circumstances.  Al Haber’s great organizing skills soon found a 
response, which proved to be a good opportunity for SDS to thrive. 
 
2.2- SDS 1960 Conference For Human Rights In The North 
 
In 1960 spring, a conference on human rights was held at University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor (April 28- May 1, 1960).  Robert Alan Haber was the 
organizer of the conference with the name of “SDS 1960 Conference For Human 
Rights In The North.” There was clearly an outstanding commitment, which was 
unexpected within the standards of the era: “Some 150 students from both the 
South and the North attended, forging ties that would become the basis of a durable 
alliance.”13  One of the most significant incidents that contributed to the 
importance of this conference was the formation of SNCC in April 1960.  
Invitation of some of the representatives from SNCC to the conference enabled the 
two groups -white student activists and SNCC activists- to interact.  At the time, 
most SDS theorists were striving hard to determine a practical approach for SDS 
that would gather activists on the one hand and be effective in the issue of social 
reform on the other hand.  As SDS and SNCC interactions continued, many 
                                                 
11 SDS Constitution, art. I. (Amended at 1959 National Convention, June 12-13, 1959). SDS 
Microfilm, Series 1, No.1.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Miller, Democracy is in the Streets, pp. 37-38. 
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attitudes began to be shaped as a result of the inspiration from SNCC.  However, 
the degree of inspiration from SNCC is still a subject for historical debate. 
Activists of southern sit-ins, Michael Harrington from LID, CORE national 
director James Farmer, and other representatives from LID, CORE and NAACP 
were also present in the conference.  Clearly there was a enthusiastic mood for 
defining a new political vision, and initiating a large-scale movement that would 
shape the leftist politics of the 1960s.   
SNCC formed after a sit-in protest held by four black students from Carolina 
A&T College on February 1, 1960.  When they entered a segregated local lunch 
counter in Greensboro, North Carolina and demanded service, the waitress refused 
constantly.  A sit-in protest held by four people during the whole day was replaced 
by a thirty people on the next day.  Gradually white students, too, attended the sit-
in protest, and a week after hundreds of students began to participate actively.  
Some local white students soon responded harshly by threatening the protestors.  
Getting afraid of the hazardous situation, “the manager closed the store, and the 
mayor called upon black students and local business leaders to halt the protests for 
two weeks in an attempt to find a solution.”14 
The struggle in Greensboro did not resolve, but gave way for a new climax 
of protest in the issue of civil rights struggle.  Using the college-church network, 
black protestors informed others throughout the whole South.  Students rapidly 
“started sit-ins at lunch counters in Winston-Salem, Durham, Raleigh, and other 
cities across North Carolina,”15 and then, spread the tactic outside the state.  In 
February, “activists were using the tactic in seven states and over 30 communities 
                                                 
14 Terry H. Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties: Protest in America from Greensboro 
to Wounded Knee (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 44. 
15 Ibid., p. 45. 
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including Nashville, Tallahassee, Chattanooga, Richmond, and Baltimore.”16  As a 
significant result of this student movement, SNCC was formed “from a group of 
Negro college students who had been brought together by some of the civil rights 
leaders interested in coordinating student sit-in movement that was spreading so 
rapidly throughout the South.”17  But more important was the fact that a new 
language of protest came out from the nature of the sit-in activisms, which 
consequently embraced by a large-scale of alienated and affiliated white students 
in the North.  The influence of the sit-in movement in the South during the early 
1960 was, as Calvert puts it, “dramatic and far-reaching” among the white students 
within a nationwide scale, as “no previous actions of the Southern civil rights 
movement had generated this kind of widespread activism among whites across the 
nation.  In effect, the 1960 sit-ins generated the activist stage of the modern white 
student movement.”18  It was within “this brief moment of time” that “the sixties 
generation entered its age of innocence, overflowing with hope,” and “it was the 
moment Al Haber waited for.”19  
Struggling for a wide appeal for SDS, Al Haber quickly endeavored to 
benefit from this atmosphere.  The attitude of the sit-ins was an appropriate pattern 
to invoke other people, especially the white students to become activists.  At the 
moment he made a correct move by inviting the Greensboro students to “SDS 
1960 Conference For Human Rights In the North.”  This invitation quite changed 
                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 45. 
17 Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, The New Radicals: A Report with Documents (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1966), p. 15.  
18 Gregory Nevala Calvert, Democracy from the Heart: Spiritual Values, Decentralism, and 
Democratic Idealism in the Movement of the 1960s (Eugene: Communitas Press, 1991), p. 89.  
19 Hayden, Rebel, p. 29. 
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the prospects.  As “the Greensboro students had agreed to attend the conference, 
Haber and Jeffrey had no trouble generating interest.”20  
“SDS 1960 Conference For Human Rights In The North” was the first large-
scale organization that held the name SDS, but it did not present the vision that 
Haber thought for the future policies of SDS.  It only gave contents of the very 
early interests of SDS as a youth section of the LID on the one hand and provided a 
permanent recognition of SDS among students and young activists on the other 
hand.  It also presented the implicit intention of gaining new supporters and new 
members to SDS.  Significantly, unorganized, but still affiliated individuals were 
also called.  This fact was one of the first and most effective organizing actions of 
SDS.  It was mostly those unorganized, restless students who later became 
members of SDS, in which they found a response to their alienation.  Many of the 
black activists at the time were uneasy for being affiliated with an older 
organization. One of them once recalled that “NAACP wanted us to be NAACP 
youth chapters, CORE wanted us to become CORE chapters, SCLC wanted us to 
become the youth wing of SCLC.  We finally decided we’d be our own thing.”21  
Al Haber thought that the same pattern was valid for the unorganized white 
students and he followed his way through this assumption.  The purpose of the 
conference, as it seemed, was yet to set a main platform for the gathering of all 
disconnected student groups and uneasy individuals within the discourse of civil 
rights struggle, but there was also an invitation for a free, autonomous, and 
intimate student organizing: 
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If you are a student who feels a moral concern about the 
extent of discrimination and segregation in your campus 
community, feel overwhelmed by the very extent of the problem, 
helpless to effect change; 
OR IF YOU are already involved in activities combating 
these evils, and would like to share your experience with others, 
and learn more effective action techniques for your own use; 
YOU WILL BE INTERESTED IN THE 1960 SDS 
PROGRAM AND CONFERENCE TO COMBAT 
DISCRIMINATION ON THE NORTH22  
 
Being the organizer of the conference, SDS was presented as “a non-partisan 
educational organization of students who are concerned with ways of increasing 
democracy.”23 
As the name of the conference also implied, almost all the stress was still 
given to the issue of racial discrimination, a topic that at the time constituted the 
major concern of student activism in the North.  SDS members noted “millions of 
Negroes and members of other minority racial and religious people are deprived of 
the right to a free choice of job, of housing, of the use of public community 
facilities.”24  The widespread discrimination and segregation happening just “in his 
own backyard ought to make the Northerner less eager to single out the South as 
the source of all wrongdoing and inequality.”25 Significantly, students were given 
the advice to act for the issues outside their campus, and to be real citizens:  
Taking effective action is relatively easy on the campus, 
but will it be possible for you to be as active and as successful a 
citizen in the “real world”?  How will you face the problem of 
segregation in the modern urban metropolis, characteristically 
divided into the ghetto of the modern urban metropolis, 
characteristically divided into the ghetto of the urban center and 
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the “lily-white” suburb? How will you face a community much 
less liberal and thoughtful than the university community?26   
 
To cope with the racial problems outside the campus, the students were 
advised to cooperate with the professionals such as “social workers, staff of civil 
rights organizations and local community relations agencies, government officials, 
university people engaged in community self-surveys, and so on.”27  The call for 
taking such kinds of professional aid implied that there was still a heavy LID 
domination of SDS.  However, Al Haber had already received the recognition he 
needed, the conference was a real success for SDS, and as a consequence, “the 
United Auto Workers donated $10,000, which resulted in employing Haber as field 
secretary and holding SDS’s first conference that June.”28 
Although the circumstances were cheering, the first SDS convention in New 
York showed that SDS still needed a certain time to develop.  There was a poor 
attendance –only thirty people- and no concrete decisions were taken.  The issue to 
be discussed was student radicalism, and several speakers soon found themselves 
to be exhausted within a theoretical, almost nonsensical debate on whether 
intellectual commitment or direct action should be taken.  There was also a “lively 
debate about the value of organizing student protests against civil defense drills –
one speaker thought such protests diverted attention from the criticism of 
American foreign policy, while another argued that the protests set the stage for 
such criticism.”29  Haber, who was elected as SDS president in this convention, 
appreciated the atmosphere of full discussion and urged that the SDS’s approach to 
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such problems should be multi-lateral and as a principle those problems should be 
open to discussion for all. 
As SDS entered the year 1961 with approximately 250 members, the 
immediate task became recruiting new and effective members.  Although there was 
a sense of idealism and hope, a clear vision for SDS was still lacking.  This was 
mainly caused by the “limits of the current student activism in the North.”30  For 
Haber, there was a lack of “a positive interpersonal dynamic,” mainly due to the 
fact that they were “not close enough to the issues.”31  While he complained that 
direct action was not a direct means of change for the total social structure, his 
deep involvement in the theoretical perspective prevented him from offering an 
alternative.  However, the seminars that he organized at the University of 
Michigan, where a “free discussion of generally relevant issues in an atmosphere 
of equality and authentic search for answers”32 was aimed for, provided him with a 
deeper knowledge of the student apathy.  He was, to a degree aware that the issues 
such as “problems of poverty, health care, wasted agricultural and natural 
resources, meaningless work… arouse students neither to demonstration nor to 
discussion.”33   
But Haber’s own attitude towards the problems of the country was still far 
from simple.  In order to call for disarmament for instance, one must in any case 
have something to say about “what to do with the man power, resources, industrial 
plant, and capital equipment that are tied in the military machine.”34 Or, to define a 
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politics of civil rights, fundamentals of social equality theories were still needed.  
However, Haber knew that a kind of community organizing that had already come 
into existence within the activism of SNCC was needed to turn SDS into a strong 
movement.  But what he understood from activism presupposed a “concentrating 
on realistic goals for student organization,”35 which necessitated to define the 
priorities firstly, and then to direct the organization’s limited energy to those 
priorities only. This stance constituted his main line of vision throughout all 
significant debates and disputes that occurred in the whole history of SDS. At he 
time, he saw in Southern students an intimate community consciousness based on 
the moral traditions of the black Church, while his conception of community spirit 
for the Northern student was compounded by theoretical inclinations such as 
intellectual discussion, academic research, and intense debate.  Hayden’s 
conception of community organizing, on the other hand, was fully content with 
Southern students’ notion.  Unlike Haber, Hayden took community organizing 
around values as the key strategic formation for political change.  Neither 
intellectual discussion nor academic research was necessary; a community that was 
ready to act already constituted a significant political power. 
The New Left and particularly SDS came to the stage with a remarkably 
steady power only when Haber’s proposal was turned upside down.  That is to say, 
the New Left became active only after its politics was defined as direct action in 
itself where theory had no significance other than sustaining it, instead of a 
conception of direct action whose value was determined by its relevance to theory, 
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that was, a direct action which “should become a pretext for ‘a deeper appraisal of 
social problems’”36  
The year 1961 marked a fledging period for SDS.  There was almost no 
significant activism led by the organization and all efforts were concentrated on 
recruiting new and particularly, strategic members.  During this period, the main 
direction of the so-called activism was navigated to a rather limited area: to the 
university campuses and to the University, which Haber thought to be a new and 
effective agent of social reform.  In December 1961, in his “Professionals and 
Social Change Project”, he declared that the SDS had “two emphases: 1) creation 
of the University as progressive force for social change in the society and 2) the 
development of a body of social criticism and program in the society generally 
toward an extension of democratic values and institutions.”37  In this way, Haber 
wrote that SDS wanted “to make social issues a concern of the university and 
…(wanted) to give the university some independence and leverage in the general 
society.”38   
 
2.3- Tom Hayden and his involvement in SDS 
 
The most important incident of this recruitment period was persuasion of 
Tom Hayden to join SDS.  Hayden’s active involvement in SDS and his becoming 
SDS president for the 1962-63 period rendered SDS with an appropriate activist 
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direction.  Hayden’s political vision offered some important answers for the 
dilemmas SDS was facing during its fledging period. 
When Haber and other SDS members met in New York on June 1960 for the 
SDS convention, Hayden was on his way to Berkeley and the Bay Area, “already 
known as the Mecca of student activism.”39  At the time, Hayden was steadily 
making a professional career as a journalist.  He was rising in the ranks of 
Michigan Daily, which he recalls as “the most important student institution on the 
campus and perhaps the most respected university paper in the United States.”40  
Before the journey to Berkeley as a journalist, Haber had offered him full time 
involvement in SDS.  Hayden refused the offer, as he clearly was not ready to give 
up his brilliant career on behalf of being an activist.  However, experiences he had 
at Berkeley and the Bay Area transformed his attitude towards his personal life.   
As he later wrote, when he arrived, “the Bay Area was radiating with a 
utopian spirit.  Support for the sit-ins was intense.  Locally, there was an electric 
effect when many students were arrested and physically hosed down on the marble 
steps of San Francisco City Hall for protesting the House Un-American Activities 
Committee.”41  On May 13, 1960, demonstrators, most of whom were students, 
demanded to attend hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee.  As 
they were refused, a protest began.  The police responded by attacking “them with 
high-pressure fire hoses, clubbed them, and hurled them down the marble steps, 
charging one demonstrator with a felony charge they could not, in the end, make 
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stick.”42  Berkeley campus also had a strained and intense atmosphere where 
SLATE—a prominent student party in Berkeley, which objected to the issues of 
nuclear armament and Cold War policies—was seeking to widen its activism 
outside the campus and was in dispute with UC administration, which forbade 
students taking any action for off-campus issues.  There, Hayden visited Livermore 
Laboratories of University of California, where studies for nuclear weapons were 
made.  With the endeavors of local activists he also had the opportunity to be faced 
with the miserable conditions of the Mexican farm workers in Delano, California.  
Struck by the realities of the region, he took off to Los Angeles in order to observe 
the Democratic Convention.  He had already been convinced in the Bay Area that 
“student activists had to be organized into campus political organizations, which 
would have to linked together into a single, unified student organization.”  For this 
he was eagerly looking forward to “the coming NSA congress as the first chance 
for many of the new student leaders across the country to meet each other face to 
face.”43 
All these experiences proved to reshape Hayden’s mind on the issue of 
becoming an activist.  But perhaps the most significant incident occurred during 
his confrontation with the protestors of the southern civil rights movement just 
outside the arena where the Democratic convention was held: 
I interviewed Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. “Ultimately, you 
have to take a stand with your life,” he told me gently.  I felt odd 
writing the words in my journalist’s notebook.  As I left the line, 
and later as I left Los Angeles, I asked myself why I should be 
only observing and chronicling this movement instead of 
participating in it.  King was saying that each of us had to be 
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more than neutral and objective, that we had to make 
difference.44 
 
Before coming to California, Hayden had already been offered to participate 
in SDS.  But he still did not consider it as a good choice to start his activist career.  
Although he was deeply affected by Haber’s radical visions at their first meeting in 
1959, his main impression was that Haber was too much absorbed in theoretical 
content of the issues and lacked romanticism.  Thus, he ignored this opportunity 
and decided to become involved in the National Student Association, which he 
thought “was the only national forum for students.”45  He was feeling affinity at 
least with some of the issues uttered within the NSA vision.  One of the older NSA 
leaders and founders, Allard Lowenstein’s sympathetic approach towards the civil 
rights movement in the south also affected Hayden’s decision.  By this time, Haber 
had already been involved in NSA, by forming a circle called the “Liberal Study 
Group,” which aimed to discuss the problems that were of “of particular 
importance to liberals and radicals of the university community.”46  In fact, 
Haber’s plan was to recruit members for SDS.  In this he was successful.  When 
SDS became “highly visible” in 1962, many of “its members were also key 
activists in the then powerful NSA.”47  Soon after, SDS took a much more 
dominant role, and “outpaced the student-government-oriented National Student 
Association and became the primary national organization for student activists.”48  
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Hayden attended the NSA congress at the University of Minnesota where 
thousands of students and leaders were in attendance.  But unexpectedly, what he 
observed during the congress was that the older NSA leaders whom he respected 
“also felt a need to keep control of their organization and shroud its sources of 
money.”  This atmosphere of “secrecy eventually led to suspicion as the spirit of 
democratic decision making among students emerged.”49  At the time there were 
implicitly three choices for Hayden:  to join the NSA establishment while 
continuing his professional career as Daily editor; to devote himself to southern 
civil rights movement; or to become involved in the Liberal Study Group, which 
Haber organized during the NSA congress in order to recruit fresh members for 
SDS: 
As I saw my options, they were to pursue reform through 
the NSA by running one of its national offices or to join Haber in 
creating the still-undefined SDS.  In either case I decided that my 
short-term focus would be the South, my task: the building of 
northern student support for the southern movement.  Finally, 
graduation came but with a decision no nearer.50  
 
As a result he moved to New York and kept himself close to both NSA and 
SDS.  But he never took seriously the SDS option.  His decision was to join the 
NSA’s ranks.  For this purpose, he attended another NSA congress at the Madison 
campus of the University of Wisconsin in the summer of 1961.  There was a heavy 
mood of determined protest on the problems of campus administration, civil rights, 
and peace.  Students, perhaps for the first time were so unified around certain 
social issues. As Hayden recalls, there was also “an underlying tension, however, 
over whether change could be brought about through the existing system of student 
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movements, liberal foundations, and the Democratic administration in Washington 
or whether more radical departures, like those pioneered by SNCC.”51  Hayden 
was a defender of the latter choice.  He ran for the vice-presidency for national 
affairs but antagonized the NSA old guard who found him much too radical and 
militant.  He withdrew his candidacy, and the moment was clearly a turning point 
both in Hayden’s activist career and in the development of SDS. 
The only chance for Hayden was to join SDS.  Haber was passionately 
endeavoring to persuade Hayden for formal participation in SDS.  Thus, he 
instantly appointed Hayden as the first field secretary of SDS.  In this Hayden saw 
the opportunity of both being involved in the civil rights movement and setting the 
background for northern campus organizing by linking northern students with the 
southern cause.  The latter aim clearly reflected one of Hayden’s political visions 
that would later shape SDS’s nature. 
 
2.4- Three early tendencies within SDS 
 
At the end of 1961, there were three distinct visions within the newly 
growing SDS.  Al Haber was urging for a campus organizing and transforming the 
university into an influential agent for social change.  Tom Hayden was defending 
student organization not only based on on-campus organizing, but also widening 
the civil rights movement.   LID, on the other hand, offered another form of 
organizing for SDS that pointed outside the campus.  Parents of SDS thought that 
the most urgent social problem of the country lay in the urban towns, where  
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“removal of municipal government to a great distance from the people” caused 
permanent problems like: “housing, education, chronic unemployment and 
underemployment, racial discrimination, organized crime and juvenile crime, 
health services, transportation, the middle-class exodus.”52  All three visions still in 
some sense proposed that the students had to be organized around some social 
issues.  Yet, at the time nobody had any strict idea about what SDS’s main vision 
should be.  But the three main tendencies discussed here constituted the early ideas 
that would eventually shape SDS activism. 
Hayden believed that SDS was in essence “a manifestation of the student 
protest movement that emerged form the sit-ins.”53  Thus, its activism should 
follow the pattern of SNCC, namely direct action outside the campus.  There had 
to be strong interaction with other sections within the society.   In a sense, 
Hayden’s aim was to connect political activism with moral values, to provide an 
authentic purpose for the students to unite them.  This purpose, according to him, 
lay in direct action.  Hayden’s political organizing style was definitely provocative.  
He ignored theoretical approaches as much as possible, while, stressing private 
problems of the youth and successfully linking them with a social cause.  He 
cautioned against the fact that the students –even activist students- were 
“scrambling to draw coherence out of …multiple academic and political pursuits” 
and this eventually left them  “intellectually barren and politically spent, falling 
back on the use of slogans, and conforming to orthodox courses of action.”54  He 
urged students to direct their activism with their own personality and authenticity.  
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Southern Negro Students’ attitudes provided him with the deepest inspirations: “in 
a real sense also they are their own leaders: they are defining the orienting policies 
of the struggle, they are restoring the individual personality to a creative and self-
cultivating role in human affairs.”55  The Greensboro affair, the sit-in movement 
and SNCC were all emerged and became influential not as a result of leadership, 
but as a result of coordinating and acting.  These were the key notions that Hayden 
embraced and pursued during his reshaping of SDS. 
Haber, on the other hand was more inclined to theory and possessed a more 
sophisticated and long-term approach.  What he wanted to create among the 
students was intellectual commitment, which was not a popular way of activism.  
His vision also included the opinion that the dynamics for social change lay within 
the institutions, and in order to transform the institutions, SDS had to direct its 
energy to the roots of those institutions.  The professionals involved in those 
institutions were the university graduates from professional programs.  His 
“Professionals and Social Change” written in December, 1961, clearly reflects this 
campus based vision: 
Most of our programming, and as well as that of the liberal, 
left, activist community, has been focused on the liberal arts 
college or on the liberal arts curriculum within the larger 
universities.  It is always a matter of wonder when a Bus. Ad. or 
Law or Med student turns up on the mailing or membership lists 
of the liberal political organizations.  Yet, the humanities-liberal 
arts programs are not the ones, by and large, producing the 
significant decision-makers in the society.  The major groups of 
social influence are the lawyers, doctors, journalists, educators 
and teachers, scientists, engineers, business administration 
graduates and like professionals.  It is important in pursuing our 
general program that we develop an orientation toward the 
professional schools and professional curriculum.56 
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Yet the students in those professional programs and professions were not 
interested in political, social, and economic corruption in America.  The education 
system that trained these people was conservative and prevented them from taking 
a social role on the issue of reform and democracy.  Most of these students kept 
their conservative stance when they graduated.  However, as Haber noted, “it is 
from these schools that the positions of responsibility, power, and status are filled 
in this society.  It is from them that the executive office of business are filled, that 
the school systems are staffed, and, as well, that the candidates for public office are 
graduated.”57  The main aim had to be to give an end to this situation through 
campus organizing. 
By this time, in order to cope with the problems of small urban towns, LID 
proposed “A Program for Urban Democracy” on October 24, 1961, which aimed to 
democratize the underdeveloped urban parts of America.  Significantly, it planned 
to invoke a tendency among the people towards political participation in order to 
cope with their problems: 
The League for Industrial Democracy believes that the 
surest way to seek political health for our cities must be the 
attempt to democratize them, and that the first step must be to 
encourage the growth of workable processes and institutions that 
are as close as possible to the people and their direct concerns 
and as open as possible to direct, popular participation.58 
 
The urban democracy defined within this program was in essence 
participatory, an approach, which SDS later defined as its main political vision.  It 
was the first time that the American left turned its face towards political 
weaknesses of urban ghettoes and small towns: 
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Political development within the typical large American 
city is one urban problem that has received little attention.  It has 
not in fact, generally been recognized as a ‘problem.’  But the 
traditional municipal forms of government which evolved 
democratically in small towns have long ceased to function 
democratically when inflated without much adaptation into large 
city.  Outbreaks of functioning urban democracy have been 
scattered, rare, and brief.59 
 
LID rendered SDS with a significant role within this program.  The students 
were supposed to be involved in the pilot-cities chosen for the program, and they 
would “participate both in the program itself and in the affairs of their own home 
communities and the communities of which their colleges are a part.”60   
In a sense, Haber’s “Professionals and Social Change Project” was a reply to 
LID’s “A Program for Urban Democracy.”  He defined SDS concerns as limited to 
campus organizing but also as endeavors for long term goals.  As those people in 
professional programs were and would be the ones that had the most dominant 
voice in the decision making process on critical issues of the country, Haber stated 
that the aim of their university and campus organization should be “not only to fill 
social slots with men of competence, but much more importantly, to examine 
critically those ‘slots’ and to fill them with men of vision.”  As a consequence of 
this aim, “the university becomes a progressive force for change in the society.”61  
In this sense, he defined SDS’s main concern outside the campus as establishing 
“close working relations with the relevant professional associations,” or working 
“for the creation of new associations.”62 
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Hayden, whose commitment was “enlarging the movement for civil rights 
outside the South,”63 was urging for direct action.  SNCC needed support, for 
Hayden’s experiences in the South showed him that it could not be successful 
alone.  At the time, “there was an entire generation to arouse, primarily about civil 
rights but also about the larger issues that SNCC itself had begun to raise.”64  With 
this concern, Hayden asked: “In what proportion should we focus on university 
and educational questions, national political issues, political theory of discussions 
of “how to do it”?”65  The present situation of SDS was so bounded with such 
theoretical discussions that reminded Hayden of the habits of the older leftist 
generation.  Ties with LID were also extending the nature of this problem.  From 
the very beginning, he possessed distrust in what he called “New York-based 
politics”, which pressed “a sense of the problems inherent in building an 
independent student organization with no resources save those of the inbred and 
old-fashioned New York circles.”66  The time-bound and overly ideological nature 
of these institutions, for Hayden, was completely inconsistent with his vision that 
was based on his student experiences.  The SNCC students, long before his SDS 
involvement, had rooted the seeds of an authentic and pragmatic commitment: 
They lived in a fuller level of feeling than any people I’d ever 
seen, partly because they were making modern history in a very 
personal way, and partly because by risking death they came to 
know the value of living each moment to the fullest.  Looking 
back, this was a key turning point, the moment my political 
identity began to take shape.  The student culture, exemplified by 
conformist fraternities and impersonal lecture halls back in Ann 
Arbor, had left me searching for more.  The Daily was engaged 
in the real world, but “objectivity” stunted my desire to make a 
commitment.  Haber and the SDS were to be respected, but they 
                                                 
63 Hayden, to SDS members, 5 December 1961. 
64 Hayden, Rebel, p. 67. 
65 Hayden, to SDS members, 5 December 1961. 
66 Hayden, Rebel, p. 45. 
 31 
were too cerebral.  Here were the models of charismatic 
commitment I was seeking- I wanted to live like them.67 
 
To point out, Hayden and Haber in fact shared the same ideas on some key 
points.  In essence, both “wanted to create a multi-issue organization” that “would 
be nonideological and avoid committing itself a priori positions about the causes or 
cures of social problems.”68  Both were eager to avoid dilemmas and sectarianism 
of the old ideologies, believing that their new vision “would distance it from the 
communist Old Left, in the minds of both its potential recruits and inevitable 
critics.”69  Like Hayden, Haber’s vision too included the presupposition that the 
new organization would evolve from experience of the students and members.  In 
their minds, there was a devout attachment to democracy and a critical approach to 
older presuppositions.  As Haber stated, “any imposition of any predetermined 
standards or categories of analysis narrows the creative potential of the 
movement.”70  Haber had also respected the position and activism of SNCC, and 
more or less shared the same concerns with it.  However, he stressed the notion 
that activism had to deal with wider problems, deeply rooted social problems.  This 
was a stance, which again made him to be absorbed within more theoretical 
thoughts.  For the Greensboro affair, he said that there was “of little intrinsic 
importance.”  The aim was not to get “equal rights or constitutional guarantees, or 
protection of the laws”, but rather, it pursued  “personal equality and dignity that 
has nothing to do with race.”71  
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In this sense, it is clear that there were certain tendencies that separated the 
two.  The differentiation was obvious to SDS members from the very beginning.  
As Bob Ross formulates, the main dispute was that “for Hayden, it was what 
formulation would mobilize people to act.  For Haber, it was what formulation was 
logically unassainable.”72  Hayden persistently asserted that, “theoretical problems 
had to be resolved through trying ideas out in practice –not through endless debate 
over theoretical documents.”73  His conception of activist participation covered a 
wide range of social issues, from “fighting for civil rights to patient efforts at 
lobbying for progressive legislation.”74  However at the time SDS was far from 
simulating such kind of participation.  As Hayden told:  “Al was pushing the idea 
of building a mailing list and sending out theoretical documents; that’s all SDS 
was.  It was not a vehicle for action.”75  He didn’t hesitate to take a critical 
position.  His writing “Politics, The Individual, and SDS” opens with an offensive 
discourse implicitly against Haber’s vision: 
What is needed politically is the person who combines the 
capacity for intellectual honesty and clarity with the ability to 
persuade and accomplish.  One quality without the other is less 
than desirable.  If only honest and clear, the individual tends to 
be encased in an ivory tower, uncontaminated by the exigencies 
of life which might test the value of his theoretic judgments.  
Rather than a participant in the political process, he becomes a 
witness.76  
 
“Politics, The Individual, and SDS” presented consistently the outline of 
Hayden’s views up to that time.  The writing continued with a critique of the 
individual in the university, who “does not recognize political guilt, except that of 
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the ‘fools’ who do not accept his dream and his reality.”  The second target was the 
individual in the American Socialist movements whose sectarianism is “a 
compulsion to be honest and clear without regard to the consequence.”  This kind 
of person possessed a “programmatic myopia,” a habit, which soon makes him 
“indistinguishable from the established power order except insofar as he is 
identified as part of the ‘loyal opposition’.” 
There is still a valuable choice for the individual, which is defined as “being 
neither too far from the centers of power to be effective nor too close to be honest.”  
For position, adopting of values, dealing with social problems honestly in a wide 
sense, and finally a nonsectarian approach are offered:  
For instance, our loyalty should be to international peace, 
and only secondarily to the Democratic Party or: to the creation 
of a left in America, and only secondarily to SDS.  It is to say 
that we do not perpetuate an organization or its own 
aggrandizement unrelated to its success in maximizing our goals. 
It is to say we don’t cling to a form because it makes us 
comfortable. 
 
Within this context, SDS also “should not view itself as a student 
movement,” and it must not “fall into deadly red baiting”.  But above all it must 
become “more than a mailing house from which arrives an occasional fact sheet or 
commentary of interest to the reader.”  Members of SDS then, “should be 
personally developing in themselves political ideals…and then working out 
deliberately the complexities of making the ideal a reality.”77 
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2.5- Hayden’s influence  
 
It was Hayden’s vision that shaped SDS’s stance.  In March 1962, he gave an 
activating speech, which would later become a SDS pamphlet called “Student 
Social Action”.  This speech, as Hayden recalled, was literally the first draft of the 
Port Huron Statement that was the most influential written document of SDS’s 
political vision.  The speech firstly pointed out the general situation in the southern 
campuses:  There was heavy paternalistic relation between the students and the 
administration.  The most important problem in protesting segregation outside the 
campus was that they did not have the right to do that in the eyes of the university 
administrators.  As a matter of fact, “most student governments lacked real power” 
because “such paternalism produced students molded in its own authoritarian 
image.”78  Consequently, students were “becoming more remote from the 
possibility of a civic life that maximizes personal influence over public affairs.  
There …(was) a deep alienation of the student from the decision-making 
institutions of the society.”79   
Being aware that remoteness of the students from each other and from other 
parts of the society was the cause of the present apathy and restlessness among the 
students, Hayden immediately linked this situation with the university’s politics: 
“Where members of an institution are linked by functional bond of being students, 
not be the fraternal bond of being people, there develops a terrible isolation, of 
man from man.”80  Indeed, the problems that the individual was faced within the 
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university, was simply an extension of the larger social and economic problems 
outside the campus.  Between academic and financial system, for example, this 
relation was obvious in the instances like the parallels “between competition for 
grades and for chamber of commerce awards, between cheating and price rigging, 
between the statements ‘attendance is a privilege, not a right’ and ‘we deserve the 
right to refuse service to anyone.’”  However, while “the university situation in 
America …(was) more a symptom than a basic cause of …problems”, a college 
was still a “place to embark on a movement of reform, a place with intellectual 
equipment and a reservoir for unused creativity, a place from which reason might 
make a last attempt to intervene in human affairs.”   
Finally, there was still a “human desire for a creative neighborhood of 
people”, which, among students would arise by “unfolding and refinement of 
moral, aesthetic, and logical capacities of men in manner that creates genuine 
independence.”81  Therefore, “the opposite of apathy was personal independence,” 
which, as Hayden wrote, “was the university’s responsibility to encourage.”82 
As Hayden recalled, the speech fulfilled its aim to invoke an activist spirit 
among the people, as “it was the right public appeal for SDS to make.”83  As James 
Miller sums up, Hayden’s attempt was “to synthesize existentialism and 
pragmatism”, and it found a good response in a provocative sense while “his 
understanding of political action remained ambiguous.”  Nevertheless, his 
pragmatic rhetoric was clear enough to make people act: “he was inviting readers 
to reinvent –and “to actively enjoy”- the world of politics.”84  There was certainly a 
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wide appeal, but in fact, it was Haber’s early recruitment efforts that had set the 
background for the wave.  In 1961, there were already “eight hundred dues-paying 
members (at one dollar a year); and two thousand scattered activists on mailing 
lists,”85 a result of Haber’s mailing organization. 
At the time, LID and SDS relations were generally in accordance.  In “The 
Urban Democracy Program” LID’s position was clear: “to encourage community 
action …and to seek ways to make such community action capable of sustaining 
itself and dealing with many problems, rather than just one.”86  LID’s stress was on 
urban democracy, but the idea of community organization was also encouraged.  
However, Hayden was not content with LID paternalism.  SDS was rooted in the 
tradition but “needful of imaginative revamping in light of new realities, new 
needs, new goals.”87  The tradition of which LID was still a part signified ideology, 
while Hayden was intent upon stressing “the development of whole human beings 
as more important than simply recruiting people to an issue or an ‘-ism’ of any 
kind.”88  If there was an example for the new student movement, this was certainly 
SNCC not LID.  The way to be followed was the path that the southern students 
had gone in Greensboro affair, in the sit-in movement; that was activism and 
coordinating; not the path imposed by old ideologies and by a paternal leadership.  
The forthcoming Port Huron Statement would become the vehicle of adapting the 
mood of southern activism for northern student activism.  In 1960 NSA Congress, 
Hayden saw in the attitudes of SNCC representatives the qualities “that were 
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needed before a genuine, lasting, and effective political movement could be 
built”:89  
They were in many ways like myself- young, politically 
innocent, driven by moral values, impatient with their elders, 
finding authentic purpose through risking their “lives, their 
fortune, and their sacred honor”- in short, a genuinely 
evolutionary leadership. In their heated intellectual discussions at 
the seminar, values were never separated from their analysis.  For 
direction, they quoted not Marx but the Talmud, not Mao but 
Camus: “A man can’t cure and know at the same time.  So let’s 
cure as quickly as we can.  That’s the more urgent job.”90  
 
Not surprisingly, the peculiar intellectual background inherent in SNCC 
would be imported to the Port Huron Statement.  To turn towards Camus and 
another neglected figure C. Wright Mills, and not towards Marx was, in a sense, an 
expression of SDS’s non-ideological stance.  The New Left’s most prominent 
differentiation from the Old Left lay in this tendency.  It is worth pointing out the 
fact that theoretical and ideological backgrounds were of secondary importance to 
the New Left practices, and this was among the key approaches to distinguish it 
from the traditional left.  Instead of Marxism, the New Left embraced the notion of 
participatory democracy and dynamic activism, both of which in fact could never 
be clarified and justified within any theoretical perspective.  Most of these 
differences were publicly expressed at the Port Huron Convention held in July 
1962.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Port Huron Convention and the Port Huron Statement 
 
3.1- Before the convention: Ann Arbor meeting 
 
The speech that would later become the pamphlet “Student Social Action” 
was given at a meeting in Ann Arbor in March 1962.  Hayden and forty activists 
gathered in Ann Arbor in order to set the conditions for turning the SDS into a new 
large national student movement.  Hayden had newly returned from the South, 
where he had experienced the bitter conditions in the south as SDS field secretary.  
He had been passively involved in the civil rights movement in Mississippi-the 
focal point of SNCC concern- and Albany, and had been arrested two times.  For 
many activists, the Albany experience resulted with a grasping of “a new sense of 
doubt among both activists and black followers toward the practice of nonviolence 
itself.”91  In the south it was difficult for love to transform hate. 
However, Hayden came to Ann Arbor with an intention of putting SDS into 
a large national organization that would be a northern instance of SNCC activism.  
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His main aim, like the other activists that met in Ann Arbor, was to turn SDS into a 
stable student organization. At the time SDS seemed to be the most appropriate 
organization to gather under, because it already had gained a satisfactory 
recognition among students.  Al Haber had set this stage:  he had constructed the 
mailing list, and made visits to many of the student leaders all over the country.  
Also, at the time, most of the SDS members were well known figures as they had 
“played a constructive role as spokesmen for liberal and democratic ideas”92 within 
the NSA and the Liberal Study Group.  Hayden became the president of SDS for 
the 1962-63 terms in order to develop this potential.   
But there was still no more than recognition of the SDS among the students.  
SDS needed devout members and affiliated masses.  There were other deficiencies, 
too.  The southern experience proved that the activists lacked immediate power due 
to the current obscurity in being an effective organization.  For Hayden, what he 
did was only “to go from beating to beating, jail to jail, a lone field representative 
for an organization that was little more than a mailing list.”93 Personally believing 
that his job within the civil rights movement in the south was limited, he turned his 
face more seriously to SDS in order to render it to be more effective.  The 
immediate problems to be solved were to define its direction as a student 
organization, and the question of whether it would be a decentralized, truly 
participatory organization. 
The Ann Arbor meeting was aimed to focus on these issues. Unexpectedly, 
all the participants proved to be eager for a commitment to SDS.  Soon after, it was 
decided that the new organization needed a stimulating manifesto for their 
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generation.  Tom Hayden was given the task of preparing the first draft of the 
manifesto.    
“Student Social Action”, given as a speech, was widely approved as the first 
draft of the forthcoming manifesto.  As the meeting continued with great 
enthusiasm and with hope, the SDS members judged that they were in the 
beginning of creating a large-scale student organization.  Al Haber rushed for a 
national convention, which the SDS members believed would be a turning point.  
Finally, “after a period of loose organization and flexibility,” it was “necessary to 
establish some order”: first, to establish an order on “who’s in the organization and 
who’s out”; and second, to clarify the nature of the relations with various chapters, 
associated groups and with independent groups with which SDS was in contact.94  
The main aim in this was, in fact, to unify these groups under SDS and to render 
SDS a dominant role in the movement.  The best way to this aim was to issue a 
manifesto.  
The preparations began to make the convention on the June.  Meanwhile, a 
problem arose: There was a need for a sponsored site to hold the convention, or 
otherwise a good deal of money to hire one.  Significantly, many of the SDS 
members had no possibility to take the latter option seriously.  They simply had no 
money, and no stable resource to get a financial support.   
This was a permanent problem of SDS all the time.  Any financial support, 
when needed, was generally gotten by chance.  This was also the case for the Port 
Huron Convention in June.  Haber for a certain time tried in vain to find a site for 
the convention.  Finally Sharon Jeffrey—a devout SDS member from the very 
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beginning—appealed to her mother, Mildred Jeffrey, a very important socialist 
figure of the interwar era, and a trade-union organizer for the United Auto 
Workers.  After the Second World War, Mildred Jeffrey continued to pursue social 
reform within the ranks of the Democratic Party.  Unlike the parents of other 
student activists, most of whom belonged to the middle class, Sharon’s mother was 
a powerful and influential figure: she was “an outspoken feminist and one of the 
most prominent women in the Democratic party, serving in the Sixties and 
Seventies on the Democratic National Committee and the national board of the 
Americans for Democratic Action,” and later became the president of the National 
Women’s Political Caucus.”95  Mildred Jeffrey responded positively and near the 
town Port Huron she arranged a site belonging to Michigan AFL-CIO (American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations).  It was a matter of 
chance that SDS found a place to hold its crucial convention.   
 
3.2- The Port Huron Statement  
 
3.2.1- Main concern of the statement: values or democracy? 
 
In April 1962, SDS issued a convention bulletin in order both to announce 
the convention and to clarify the issues and visions to be handled in the 
convention.  The main aim of the convention was to “adopt a ‘political manifesto’ 
expressing the intellectual and programmatic outlook of the organization.”96  The 
key term was the concept of democracy.  The political manifesto would primarily 
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deal with the concept of democracy in a way to clarify its notion within the left and 
to “provide a much needed statement of conviction and program for the young left 
in America.”97  For this purpose, SDS members believed that the concept needed to 
be clarified with regard to the current situation of the American society. 
However, what emerged was, in outlook, a critique of American society in 
moral terms, “a compelling vision of a regenerated society, and a sketch of a 
strategy for moving forward.”98  There was apparently a moral approach in the Port 
Huron Statement, which was sometimes seen as a more prominent issue among the 
others.  Significantly, “it was the first manifesto in the history of the twentieth-
century American Left to focus primarily on the problem of ethical existence.”99  
Thus, this was identified as a totally new approach, and this fact was the cause of 
this prominence.  Most of the SDS members possessed a deep ethical background 
and this played a role in shaping their vision.  Hayden for example, was 
particularly interested in the relation of human values and politics, which “led him 
to the works of Albert Camus, and existentialism provided him a framework for 
exploration of values in a non-theistic framework.”100  This was the mood of the 
sixties and Hayden was an ideal example.  There was a general interest in 
existentialism among the whole generation, which consequently entailed a concern 
with deep moral and spiritual values.  This was an inseparable part of their attempt 
to formulate a new vision of social reform, and significantly “it gave them some 
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basis, other than the Judeo-Christian tradition, for justifying their moral 
convictions and for the expression of their humanistic values.101  
But it would be a mistake to conceive the Port Huron Statement as solely a 
moral critique.  To attain a moralistic attitude was neither an end in itself, nor the 
main problem in the Port Huron Statement.  The main concern was the problem of 
democracy and power in American society.  Unless a desired democracy was 
attained, a moral possession was not desirable.  Participatory democracy was the 
target and was also an ideal.  However ambiguous, it was the key term that made 
meaningful all the lines of critique in the Port Huron Statement.  The most difficult 
concern of SDS was to define some deep problems in American society—problems 
that would interest a vast portion of the society.  What the old left proposed was far 
from this approach because Marxist ideology was the key concern.  Clearly 
Marxism was never close to American values and ideals and thus the old left failed 
to connect itself with the masses.  Participatory democracy was, on the other hand, 
more close to the American mind.  SDS members were aware of the fact that 
nobody would oppose the notion of participatory democracy as an ideal.  Any 
opposition or any discussion would arise only on the task of giving it a clear 
definition and a strict application.  However, as an ideal, participatory democracy 
was not a vague notion.  The problems aroused only when it came to put it in 
practice.  In this sense, the importance of participatory democracy was rather that it 
was a valuable instrument for defining the political and social deficiencies. What 
stood at the opposite side of this ideal was defined as a deficiency or a problem—
for instance, an unbalanced distribution of power.  However naïve, SDS members 
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thought that it was an easy and clear way, a practical method to reach to the 
masses.        
 
3.2.2- Content of the statement 
 
The document opens with a justification of the alienation among students and 
the causes that led them to activism.  The roots of student activism were based on 
two main causes in the statement.  First one is “the permeating and victimizing fact 
of human degradation, symbolized by the Southern struggle against racial bigotry,” 
and second one is “the enclosing fact of the Cold War, symbolized by the presence 
of the Bomb.”102  There were certainly other significant social problems, too. But, 
these two “were too immediate and crushing in their impact, too challenging in 
their demand,” and thus individuals were more urgently needed to “take the 
responsibility for encounter and resolution.”103  Initially the statement embraced 
the issues of civil rights and the peace movement as the most crucial issues, and in 
a sense justified their cause with the political implications of these two.   
Recognizing the fact that they were a minority against a vast majority of a 
mass society, the most outstanding paradox they faced was also defined in the 
initial stage of the document: “we ourselves are imbued with urgency, yet the 
message of our society is that here is no viable alternative to the present.”104  
Although SDS members recognized the situation with pessimism, they doubted 
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that within this static and affluent society, most individuals, in an existentialist 
sense, could feel an anxiety about their role within this society:  
And if these anxieties produce a developed indifference to 
human affairs, do they not as well produce a yearning to believe 
there is an alternative to the present, that something can be done 
to change circumstances in the school, the workplaces, the 
bureaucracies, the government?  It is to this latter yearning, at 
once the spark and engine of change, that we direct our present 
appeal.105 
 
In his Radical Paradoxes, Peter Clecak bases the later SDS failures on the 
assumption that, as early activists were “unable to calculate the narrow range of 
American politics, they could not know how quickly their activity would dramatize 
the inherent weakness and limitations of a radical youth movement in an advanced 
capitalist society”106  Therefore, “it was a consequence of this interplay between 
their own expectations and the resistance of society (that) propelled the drive 
toward sectarianism.”107  But it seems that unlike the suggestion of Clecak, SDS 
was deeply aware of the difficulties they were actually facing from the beginning. 
Even in the earliest stages, SDS members knew that American society was 
materially so improved that this virtually rendered social reform virtually 
impossible.  In this context, the new generation had “witnessed the exhaustion not 
only of Utopias, but of any new departures as well.”108  It was therefore upon these 
pessimistic presuppositions that SDS built up its idealistic vision.  Granting that 
there was such a problem within their cause, SDS members still hoped that “the 
search for truly alternatives to the present, and a commitment to social 
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experimentation with them, is a worthy and a fulfilling human enterprise.”109  But, 
to point out, it was the possession of power and not the resistance of the society 
that SDS members proposed as the main social problem.  Clecak admits that “the 
young left displayed a partial awareness of the chief dilemmas of contemporary 
American radicalism: the paradox of powerlessness and the moral ambiguities of 
politics.”110  In the issue of social resistance to reform, the statement declared, “the 
dominant institutions are complex enough to blunt the minds of their potential 
critics, and entrenched enough to swiftly dissipate or entirely repel the energies of 
protest and reform, thus limiting human expectancies.”111  But still, the most 
serious SDS vision included the intention that still “something can be done to 
change circumstances in the school, the workplaces, the bureaucracies, the 
government.”112  This, as SDS members believed, “would replace power rooted in 
possession, privilege, or circumstance by power and uniqueness rooted in love, 
reflectiveness, reason, and creativity.”113  The importance of the effort to activate 
SDS as an educational organization was justified in this approach.  But educational 
aims did not constitute the priority.  The dominant figure in creating the statement 
was Hayden and the document significantly opened with an emphasis on the civil 
rights movement.  However, a certain emphasis was still given to education 
because the statement was planned to reflect every concern within SDS.  Hayden 
was the most prominent writer of the statement, but the statement was not solely a 
reflection of his own vision.  It was planned to be an open document; one that 
would stimulate further discussions on vision.  Immediately after the Port Huron 
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Convention, Hayden stepped up his voice for his original vision, and opened a 
debate on some of the issues like on-campus organizing and educational aims that 
were stressed in the statement.  
Without doubt, SDS members believed that the power in the American 
nation was held by The Military-Industrial Complex.  It was “the most spectacular 
and important creation of authoritarian and oligopolistic structure of economic 
decision-making in America” and defined as “the powerful congruence of interest 
and structure among military and business elites.”114  This formation was the result 
of “the rise of the military and the installation of a defense-based economy.”115  It 
is argued in the statement that “the military and its supporting business foundation 
have found numerous forms of political expression,” and with this assumption, 
“business and politics, when significantly militarized, affect the whole living 
condition of each American citizen.”116  Within this power structure, some SDS 
members believed that the true vision was to seek the way for realigning the 
Democratic party.  This was the most reliable option to modify the power structure 
when applied with a programmatic university reform: 
True, the Dixiecrat-GOP coalition is the weakest point in 
the dominating complex of corporate, military, and political 
power.  But the civil rights, peace, and student movements are 
too poor and socially slighted, and the labor movement too 
quiescent, to be counted with enthusiasm.  From where else can 
power and vision be summoned? We believe that the universities 
are an overlooked seat of influence.117  
 
Thus, the SDS members offered to turn towards the university as the basic 
institution of social change.  The statement points out that the university “is the 
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central institution for organizing, evaluating, and transmitting knowledge,”118 and 
thus the central institution of possessing knowledge as a means of influence and 
power.  However, the situation of the American university was also dismaying.  
Professors and administrators were silent on the social issues, curriculums did not 
reflect what a critical academic study should be and idealist vision was outmoded.  
All the educational means, with the curriculum, were ordered solely by the 
administration.  The statement argues that within this condition “the student learns 
by his isolation to accept elite rule within the university, which prepares him to 
accept later forms of minority control” and so “the real function of the educational 
system-as opposed to its more rhetorical function of “searching for truth”-is to 
impart the key information and styles that will help the student get by, modestly 
but comfortably, in the big society beyond.”119 However, among the students, there 
was restlessness and thus, there was a potential for a social reform movement.  It 
was clear that many of them were “breaking the crust of apathy and overcoming 
the inner alienation that remain the defining characteristics of American college 
life.”120 
Finally, the ideal aim of the movement, the target of social reform, is 
described in the statement as a democracy of individual participation in the 
American society, which seeks these principles:  
that decision-making of social sequence be carried on by 
public groupings; 
that politics be seen positively, as the art of collectively 
creating an acceptable pattern of social relations; 
that politics has the function of bringing people out of 
isolation and into community, thus being a necessary, though not 
sufficient, means of finding meaning a personal life; 
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that the political order should serve to clarify problems in 
a way instrumental to their solution.121  
 
This is the notion of participatory democracy, the central focus of SDS 
vision.  It was rather an ideal to reach, rather than a realistic demand within the 
current situation of American society.  Its meaning was never fully clarified, and in 
this way it stressed the pragmatic side inherent in SDS.  It was mostly with the 
vague character of the participatory democracy that SDS could pursue open 
debates and encouraged full individual participation in shaping its vision.  
 
3.2.3- The statement’s concern with American society 
 
It is worth pointing out that the statement reflects the reluctance of SDS 
members to embrace a strict social theory in offering a solution to the problems.  A 
set of values replaced theory mainly because the statement “meant to support broad 
consensus rather than a formal doctrine.”122  In this sense the discourse on the 
values implies the weak point of the SDS vision.  This weak point was that the 
statement in fact lacked a strict problem to offer to a broad consensus except the 
peace issue and segregation and SDS members sought to fill this deficiency by 
introducing a set of values.  The other concerns other than the peace issue and 
segregation were quite abstract with regard to the interests of the society: the Cold 
War context and its impact upon the society, apathy among the middle class, 
formation of a mass society as a result of the political stalemate and affluence, 
alienation and powerlessness.  Therefore, what the statement advised were not 
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urgent and incentive alternatives for the public: “aspiration of individual 
empowerment, for community, and for personal wholeness and authenticity,… 
translation of private troubles into legitimate political concerns” and exposing “the 
invisible connections in the entangling web of issues that plagued the nation and 
the world.”123  There was inherently a “distance between ends and means, between 
the rhetoric of the desirable and the agenda of the attainable.”124  Appealing to 
values was a last resort to invoke a tendency for reform in a mass society.   
Most SDS members were aware of the fact and this forced them to modify 
their radical visions in a way to compromise with the power.  By “making 
compromises and seeking temporary alliances, they were actually looking for an 
alternative formula with which to transform the United States into democratic 
utopia.”125  For this reason, there was in the statement a “continuity with traditional 
American ideas of popular self-government, egalitarian ethics, and social justice.126  
The ambiguity of the concept of participatory democracy, which opened the way 
for compromise, also reflects this non-radical stance.  Having continuity with 
American traditions and rendering the SDS members to offer a social reform by 
compromising with power, the concept of participatory democracy was the 
strongest and most key point of the statement.  But the problem to be discussed is 
whether there was a deep-rooted problem in American politics and society, which 
could render the concept of participatory democracy a concrete orientation.    
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3.2.4- Ideological origins of the statement 
 
With regard to the issue of democracy and power, there was an implicit 
influence from DeTocqueville.  Affiliated students, together with the southern civil 
rights activists and the poor were a minority against a disinterested majority and 
The Military-Industrial Complex.  If there was any concrete problem to define in 
this context, it was the problem of tyranny of the majority, asserted by 
DeTocqueville.  What SDS aimed for was to invoke in the society a feeling of 
suspicion and opposition against the majority.  To believe in a kind of democracy 
where the majority unquestionably holds the power, was the deep problem and was 
the source of the apathy among the individuals.  In this sense, the SDS attitude 
became exactly what DeTocqueville thought:  
There are those not afraid to say that in matters which 
only concern itself a nation cannot go completely beyond the 
bounds of justice and reason and that there is therefore no need to 
fear giving total power to the majority representing it.  But that is 
the language of a slave.127  
 
Besides, there already existed apparent injustices and irrational situations 
continuing due to this tyranny of majority.  The most striking example was the 
issue of southern segregation, on which many of the activists were faced with what 
Tocqueville feared: 
My greatest complaint against democratic government as 
organized in the United States is not, as many Europeans make 
out, its weakness, but rather its irresistible strength.  What I find 
most repulsive in America is not the extreme freedom reigning 
there but the shortage of guarantees against tyranny.128  
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Many of the activists noticed in the south and particularly in Mississippi that 
it was the strong bonds between the white segregationists and the local government 
that prevented them from achieving practical results.  Blacks lacked voting rights, 
and therefore they, with the white allies, could constitute only a minority against 
this tyranny.  The situation in Mississippi was the example of the contradiction 
between American democracy and the American ideal of freedom.  The power is 
held unconditionally by the majority, therefore “freedom is in danger when that 
power finds no obstacle that can restrain its course and give to moderate itself.”129  
This problem was valid in the national sphere too, especially when it was the case 
of jurisdiction.  As DeTocqueville states: 
In the United States, when the majority has irrevocably 
decided about any question, it is no longer discussed.  Why? 
Moral authority exercised by the majority over thought.  
Democratic republics have turned despotism into something 
immaterial.130 
 
Thus, it is with DeTocqueville’s account of American democracy that the 
concept of participatory democracy gets a clear implication.  The concept was 
rather vague, and had no sense in the issue of application, as many of its critics 
asserted.  But with DeTocqueville’s account of actual democracy, it at least found 
a ground to be based on, or to put it differently; it could define a clear problem to 
base itself upon.     
It was undoubtedly C. Wright Mills’ account of American politics and 
society that influenced explicitly and directly the vision in the Port Huron 
Statement.  Although he was a leftist, Mills rejected much of the suppositions of 
Marxism and the old left.  He relinquished the classical homogenous categories 
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like “ruling class”, “bureaucratic politicians”, or “military clique” and instead 
proposed a heterogeneous concept called “the power elite”.  
This involved “the often uneasy coincidence of economic, military, and 
political power”131 and its way of holding the power nourished by “the 
transformation of the publics of America into a mass society.”132  By expanding 
and centralizing its hierarchies, the power elite eventually began to manipulate “the 
middle levels of political power,”133 and in this way outmoded them as a means of 
social change.  What was crucial in Mills’ account was that the power elite existed 
“in a weakened and formal democratic system containing a military order already 
quite political in outlook and demeanor.”134  SDS members interpreted the Cold 
War period with a direct influence from Mills’ account: there was a permanent war 
economy nourishing the power elite as a consequence of this, there were a mass 
society and a formal and weakened democracy.  The idea that the political 
powerlessness of the individual was the consequence of this situation was also 
captured from Mills: 
 The distance between the individual and centers of 
power has become greater, and the individual has come to feel 
powerless.  Between political hope and political realization there 
are the two parties and the federal bureaucracy, which, as means 
of political action, often seem to cut the nerve of direct political 
interest.  Indifference may thus be seen as an understandable 
response to a condition of powerlessness.135  
 
The remedy was the notion of participatory democracy.  But it was again 
Mills who warned that the nation’s problems were not manifest and mostly remote 
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from the individual’s everyday life as far as the individual was in content with 
his/her life.  On the attitude of the Power Elite he declared:    
There is nothing conspiratorial about it, although its 
decisions are often publicly unknown and its mode of operation 
manipulative rather than explicit.136 
 
Therefore, the most basic problem of SDS vision was again the fact that in so 
far as the problems were unseen at the individual sphere, they were not problems at 
all.  Thus, to define SDS as an educational organization and to direct its energy 
toward educational efforts were more sound strategies than to step up immediate 
activism.  In this dismaying context, Mills saw that the only possibility for the left 
was to “to capture the political intellect in order to gain a continual re-evaluation of 
its going program” and in order to make public a continuous “bookkeeping” of the 
U.S. political economy.137 
The dominant figure in creating the vision in the Port Huron Statement was 
Tom Hayden.  He was not only in charge of adopting the first draft, but was also 
the key figure in deciding content of the original manifesto.  This was a natural 
outcome.  When it was the case of expressing and clarifying the mutual concerns 
of students, he was a natural talent.  When a SDS member, Richard Flacks recalled 
his involvement in SDS, he particularly remembered how Hayden’s speech 
“Student Social Action” influenced him more than anything: 
The language they were talking, the ideas, were all of a 
piece.  But no one expressed it better than Hayden in that speech.  
He was putting into words what I have been feeling but had not 
been able to imagine articulating.  Once I heard these words, I 
said “I know I believe in this.”138 
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Almost everybody in SDS shared what Flacks thought.  Hayden was the 
speaker.  SDS vision was the sum of many people’s mutual concerns, but it was 
Hayden who shaped and clarified that vision.  If there was a discussion on Port 
Huron, he was always at the center.  There was a natural consensus among the 
students that whenever a dispute arose, he should be the spokesman.  Another SDS 
member, Bob Ross remembered the dominance but also the stunning harmony that 
Hayden captured in the Port Huron Statement: 
“Tom was The Writer.  Everyone knew that he was The 
Writer.  That was something in between being a recorder of 
people’s ideas and saying to people, ‘This is what you really 
mean.’  Tom was a genuine leader.  He led because he really did 
express what people wanted.”139  
 
In this sense, although SDS was truly open to individual leadership and open 
discussion, there was nevertheless a prominent leadership of one figure.  But 
everybody was content with this situation.  This situation was beneficial for SDS, 
especially when it was the case that SDS was a newly emerging organization.  In 
that sense, Hayden’s leadership role and his charming aura were effective factors 
in preventing an early dissolution.   
 
3.2 The vision in SDS Convention Bulletin 
 
The Port Huron Statement was not in itself a key document that changed 
dramatically the course of events.  It was rather an expression of a movement that 
had already been existed potentially if not separately.  Its contents clearly did not 
reflect new visions or new concerns.  It is apparent that the main vision and the 
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main concerns of the student movement had already been defined in SDS 
Convention Bulletin issued in early 1962.  The participants invited to the 
convention had all been acquainted with these.  In the case of discussing these 
predetermined issues, SDS members even knew who would oppose and who 
would not.  The key subjects of the Port Huron Statement such as the situation of 
American society, a need for a new democratic vision and a serious campus 
organizing were all examined with details in early 1962:      
 An exploding world population and a nuclear weaponry 
threatening to explode the world, new nationalisms seeking the 
readiest way to throw off economic exploitation, poverty, and 
political dependency; complex bureaucratic and corporate 
structures changing the relation of man to his work, to his 
government and to his community; incredible strides in 
technology, medicine and industrial productivity: these are the 
new realities.140 
 
With the “new realities” that had been defined and announced before the Port 
Huron Convention, the remedy to these harsh realities and problems had also been 
defined.  What was needed was a public, responsible, and influential left, “not one 
housed in garrets, lunatic and ineffectual; … not empty or deluded in its goals and 
sterile in its action; … not deadened by its failures or chained by myopic view of 
human possibility; … not timid and intellectually paralytic.”141  In defining this 
kind of left, a clear distinction from the old left was explicitly made.  It would 
neither be the one “that emasculates its principles before the icons of unity and 
bipartisanship” nor be the one that “induces sectarian rigidity” that “encourages 
stereotyped rhetoric.”142  Rather, the new left had to take up a hopeful, idealistic 
and imaginary vision and turn this vision into concrete programs of social reform.  
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Thus, it was not the Port Huron Statement that first stated the ideological divisions 
between the new and the old left.  In fact, there was no such division explicit in 
Port Huron Statement.  Most of the crucial issues on the vision of SDS were taken 
up more explicitly in the Convention Bulletin.   
For instance, the notion of systematic organizing within the campus in terms 
of a political party form was also investigated in the bulletin.  The aforementioned 
reform movement came “too infrequently from the Democratic and socialist 
parties, the trade unions, the liberal, civil rights, civil liberties and peace 
organizations, the writers and members of the various professions.”143  Thus, 
American University ranked among the most reliable institutions for the new left.  
By “putting forth a platform presenting student interests and concerns running 
candidates for student government and pushing legislation, maintaining issue 
committees for action and internal education,” SDS aimed “to build cooperative 
relations with existing parties and to encourage SDS groups to adopt the political 
party reform.”144  In offering a political party politics for student organization, the 
main aim was political education through which a legitimate progressive social 
movement could be built: 
The view that we tried to develop … was that the youth 
movement should not be side-tracked in parochial concerns 
isolated from the context of the national political picture, that our 
activity on local issues should be judged by criteria deriving from 
a perspective on the problems and priorities of national politics, 
that our activity in the university should be toward making that a 
more effective institution or agency for social change in America 
and, that our involvement in student government should be 
viewing it as the democratic framework in which political ideas 
can be made legitimate and relevant to the student community, 
and as the agents of students in working for university reform.145 
                                                 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
 58 
 
As a result, SDS had already defined its objectives in the beginning of the 
year 1962.  The Port Huron Statement did not announce any new visions.  What it 
did was only to provide a concrete reference point of the issues.  It was also a 
concrete expression of a present restlessness among students of the middle class.  It 
provided the points that were mutual to those people and therefore, was effective in 
uniting separated groups and gathering them together under SDS.  This means that 
the Port Huron Statement was a document that, apart from other concerns, was 
planned for a particular purpose.  This plan was to step up SDS voice and to 
organize people under SDS and not under any local organization that would have 
the same vision.  It was simply with the help of this manifesto that SDS would be 
turned into a concrete organization with a solid vision.  In this, the main aim was to 
render SDS to possess a stable place within the area of activist politics:  
Emerging from the June convention we had a perspective.  
If someone asked what SDS believed in, we could point to the 
Port Huron Statement and use that as our touchstone.146 
 
Another serious point is that the statement clarified what the discontent 
students had in their minds.  Significantly it was in the Port Huron Statement that 
an intellectual and ideological justification was provided for the movement.  
Actually, the intellectual and ideological background involved in the statement was 
not composed of any new figures:  The students who took part in the convention 
already “had learned from C. Wright Mills, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Albert 
Camus, and communitarian anarchists.”147  But it was in the Port Huron Statement 
that all those mutual points among the students were identified and announced.  By 
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articulating those points mostly with Hayden’s words, the statement significantly 
helped in coordinating these students. 
 
3.3- Port Huron Convention 
 
Port Huron Convention held in July 1962 was important not only because it 
was the moment that the Port Huron Statement came into life, but because of some 
other crucial reasons.  Firstly, the idea of having a living manifesto—an idea, 
which reflects the SDS spirit very well—emerged unintentionally at this 
convention.  Second, a community spirit by which all the participants could 
involve in full discussion on the political issues was firstly rendered.  Finally, a 
real conflict with the parental organization LID first occurred at this convention. 
SDS was clearly not a simple organization of political dissent.  It was also an 
intimate community organizing, within which people could freely discuss and 
express themselves, but more importantly, could take active part in both defining 
and navigating the nature of the movement.  These patterns had already been set 
long before the convention.  But the prepared manifesto had initially been 
conceived as a fixed document of reference in the case of a need to clarify the SDS 
vision.  Thus, although the SDS members would have had a decisive role in SDS, 
this role had still been bounded by the document.  Significantly, this 
presupposition had to be altered in the Port Huron Convention due to a disorder in 
the arrangement efforts for the meeting.    
Haber and Hayden decided to send a copy of the seventy-five pages draft to 
the participants before their arrival to the convention.   As there was the problem of 
arranging the convention place, the posting of the draft copies started late.  Thus, 
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the copies would reach most of those participants only when they were about to set 
out on their trip to Michigan.  As a result, when they came to the convention, most 
of the attendants were not well-informed about the details in the draft although 
they already had known the visions of SDS proposed in it.  Hayden recalls that 
when they arrived, most of the people “began complaining that the draft manifesto 
was too long and had arrived too late for their examination.”148  The situation 
became dismaying because while it was necessary to have a manifesto urgently, 
most of the attendants inclined to reject it for the mentioned reasons.  The idea of 
having the Port Huron Statement as a “living document” came at that moment.  As 
a principle not premeditated, the document was then supposed to be one which was 
open to discussion, change and revision for all the time.  In this way, SDS became 
a fully participatory organization that was without any fixed imperatives. 
As the seventy-five-page draft needed reconsideration, the students were 
separated into small groups in order to discuss the sections just before the meeting.  
Both the major and the minor sections all were discussed by each group without 
exception.  There was an intimate mood, a first instance of what was defined as 
community organizing: 
We designed small democratic groups-something like 
those which C. Wright Mills had imagined- to sit around tables, 
or under trees, drinking coffee, taking notes, arguing animatedly, 
over eight separate sections of the draft: themes and values, the 
role of students, American politics, the economic system, racism, 
communism, foreign policy, and the nuclear issue.149 
 
The participants demanded that the draft had to be rewritten but “it was also 
obvious that a group of 60 people could not rewrite the document in three days.”150  
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Therefore, it was as a consequence of this fact that the draft was turned into a 
discussion paper although it had been planned as a real first draft before the 
meeting.  In this way, people could have the opportunity to discuss democratically 
the contents and the vision of their SDS.  The notion of active participation in 
decision-making and the situation where “Haber’s ‘seminar model’ of politics put 
into practice”151 both came into existence firstly at this meeting. 
There was finally a crucial situation that made the meeting important: among 
the sixty participants invited, there were some key figures from the old left.  Some 
of these figures were invited because it was still important for the students to hear 
their ideas on the new left vision.  However, the others were invited only because 
of the fact that there was a dependency on the AFL-CIO for the site.  To point out, 
quite different camps were ready in this decisive meeting.  Most SDS members had 
a positive attitude towards those guests because they believed that as they 
“attempted to break new ground it would be important to have sympathetic and 
established friends who could defend and interpret” the newly born vision with 
regard to the existing political context.152  Nevertheless, there was a certain 
negative feeling towards what all those old leftists represented, especially towards 
the mood of sectarianism: 
Those of us entering SDS from nonpolitical backgrounds 
found this atmosphere amusing, obscure, and irrelevant; like 
fervent religious sects poring over catechism or the Torah.  I 
could not understand how seemingly serious people could get so 
enmeshed in such endlessly divisive hairsplitting debates.  Surely 
there was no lesson in their experience for us.153 
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SDS members had a positive attitude towards the guests from the old left.  
But, probably as only a principle, they had also no negative feeling about the other 
guests from any other sections of the American left.  One of those guests was Jim 
Hawley, a seventeen-year old representative from the Progressive Youth 
Organizing Committee, the youth group of the Communist Party.  He was 
uninvited and demanded to have a seat as a nonvoting observer.  For the first time 
a dispute with the LID came into existence at that moment.  The LID was an 
organization with a staunch and unconditional anti-Communist attitude, and 
expected from its youth chapter the same attitude.  However, SDS’s vision was 
that the kind of democracy they were trying to press for was an attitude without 
any prejudice: 
Democracy, we are convinced, requires every effort to set 
in peaceful opposition the basic viewpoints of the day; (and) only 
by conscious, determined, though difficult, efforts in this 
direction will the issue of communism be met appropriately.154 
 
The LID representatives instantly objected to allowing an observer from the 
Communist Party.   This was a very important problem, bigger than SDS members 
could guess. To allow Hawley in the meeting was to violate “the long-standing 
traditions of the League for Industrial Democracy.”155  As one member of SDS, 
Steve Max recalled, to the LID it was almost “like recognizing Cuba” while for the 
rest, “it wasn’t anything.”156  But SDS members did not take a step back and 
responded that any observer would be tolerated in the meeting.  This response was 
mainly because of the fact that the problem was implicitly centered on the issue 
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that “SDS didn’t want to be told whom it could and couldn’t let observe.”157  
Hawley left the meeting on the second day by his own will.  But in fact his 
presence was not the cause of the dispute.  Michael Harrington, who up to that time 
regarded himself as the dominant figure-a leader- of the young socialists, had 
already felt that SDS was pressing for its own vision and own leadership.  In this, 
Tom Hayden was the leading figure.  The real dispute soon broke out over this 
hidden feeling. 
The explicit concern of the dispute however, was the handling of the issues 
of Communism and the labor movement in the Port Huron Statement.  Harrington 
had read a copy of document before arriving at the meeting and was ready to start a 
fight.  The statement’s critique of current anti-Communism not only targeted the 
American society and the political institutions, but also targeted the LID approach: 
Thus much of the American anti-communism takes on the 
characteristic of paranoia.  Not only does it lead to the perversion 
of democracy and to the political stagnation of a warfare society, 
but it also has the unintended consequence of preventing an 
honest and effective approach to the issues.  Such an approach 
would require public analysis and debate of world politics.  But 
almost nowhere in politics is such a rational analysis possible to 
make.158 
 
Harrington never tried to make any debate on world politics at the meeting.  
No matter what lay behind Harrington’s criticism, anti-Communism was an 
inseparable part of his and the LID vision.  The critique of the national policy-
making in the statement, which objected to the assumption that “the Soviet Union 
is inherently expansionist and aggressive, prepared to dominate the rest of the 
world by military means”159 was enough to alert him.  The statement also declared 
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“almost without regard to one’s conception of dynamics of Soviet society and 
foreign policy, it is evident that the American military response has been more 
effective in deterring the growth of American democracy than communism.”160  It 
was too much for even the mildest LID representative at the meeting. Upon these 
lines an angry debate over SDS attitude toward Communism inevitably began. 
What was disturbing for the SDS members, and especially for Hayden, was a 
heavy paternalistic and sometimes paranoid approach from the LID 
representatives.  Hayden recalls that the debate on Communism took the shape of a 
“doctrinal litmus test.”161  In the outlook there was not a serious disagreement on 
the issue of Communism.  What Hayden did was simply to question “whether the 
Soviet Union was inherently expansionist, aggressive, and bent on taking over the 
world by military means, or whether it was becoming a defensive and paranoid 
status quo power.”162   Harrington was tough on the issue, but this was not actually 
a problem.  The question on Communism was not a priority in the SDS vision.  As 
Hayden offered that they “end the distinction between communist hunger and 
anticommunist hunger” and should have a more rational approach on Communism, 
Harrington agreed.163  He said “an unreasoning anticommunism has become a 
major social problem for those who want to construct a more democratic 
America.”164  The dispute on communism was actually almost over, but nobody 
cared about that.  
It was rather the style of discussion that made the differences apparent and 
deeply separated the two sides.  Harrington shouted almost all over the time.  To 
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many students and observers, his antagonism exceeded the limits of an ideological 
discussion.  A polite dispute turned into a territorial offense against the new 
generation’s potential status.  Harrington’s mistake was his tough response.  Most 
of the students were disappointed as their political idol shouted without an 
apparent cause and proved to be an uncompromising figure.  For the students, it 
was totally a strange behavior: 
Many of those listening were stunned.  Michael 
Harrington was a friend, an ally, a model- just the year before, 
Hayden had cited Harrington as one of the two political figures 
young leftists admired.165 
 
The cause of Harrington’s nervous, uncompromising behavior was that a 
totally new movement was about to emerge at the Port Huron Convention.  The 
vanguards of this movement were the students with their own leadership.  In fact it 
was mostly this behavior that weakened his position among the students.  
Harrington was faced with a sudden shift of his image at the convention: 
  “I’d always been the youngest at everything I’d ever 
done…. My self-image was as a young person.  Now, I’m in this 
Oedipal situation.  Up comes this younger generation.  I think 
that they are ignoring my honest, sincere and absolutely profound 
advice.  And this struck at my self-image.  I think that part of my 
emotional overresponse was there: I interpreted this as an 
Oedipal assault on the father-image.”166   
 
Harrington found himself unable to make a decision on which side he would 
involve himself: old left or the new left?  On the part of the students, he lost his 
leadership position. Apparently, it was the time for Hayden to take the leadership 
role.  As Harrington was dragging himself to a dilemma, Hayden appreciated the 
situation:  “It was a setup,” he concluded; and “there couldn’t be a more perfect 
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setup.  We were giving birth to some new force in American politics.  And 
Michael, purely by virtue of being older and having other attachments, was being 
an obstacle.”167  
Harrington’s response was harsh.  After the convention Tom Hayden and Al 
Haber were suspended from the LID.  This meant that the ties between SDS and 
the LID were about to break if SDS did not take a step back.  Most SDS members 
were content with a disconnection.  Apart from ideological differences, there was a 
certain problem with the LID.  LID’s tax-exempt status was for a long time a 
serious obstacle that prevented SDS “to engage in political partisan activity.”168  In 
fact, SDS members were not partisan activists and therefore a serious conflict on 
this issue did not emerge up to that time.  What was disturbing was that this caused 
a parental domination of the LID over SDS.  
But a rational approach dictated to SDS members that a break with the LID 
would have severe consequences at the time.  SDS had no money and no fund-
raising while “staying with LID meant two salaries, worth $120 a week, and office 
overhead” and “being part of a ready-made network of links to the liberal and labor 
left in America.”169  Thus, after a participatory discussion, SDS members decided 
to take a step back.  The section about Communism in the statement was revised 
and relations with LID were repaired.         
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3.4- After Port Huron  
 
The SDS national convention in Port Huron and the Port Huron Statement 
did not resolve most of the serious problems of developing SDS.  For Hayden, it 
was with this convention that SDS “found a broad leadership and widespread 
support.”170  This was true, but the real problems to be solved were quite different.  
In fact, “the statement and relatively few people who had formulated it, who 
believed it, and who would work to make that vision a reality”171 were all that SDS 
had on the credit side.  In the 1962 national council report, the situation was 
honestly described: “there was a paper membership (and) no one knew how many, 
or who was paid up” and “there was a series of chapters who had never heard of 
us, others whom we have heard from this Fall who to our surprise considered 
themselves related to us.”172  The roots of this problem did not lay in the existing 
chapters and members, but, as the report declared, lay rather at the center.  Most of 
the time after the convention “has been spent in personal re-education and 
acclimation,” the report said, and this caused the fact that “the expected direction 
which was to have emanated from the national office has not come.”  The 
executive staff “has been somewhat directionless and has found only requests for 
help rather than help itself.”  To conclude, SDS “has not yet done much.  Nothing 
much has ‘happened.’  A few programs, more or less successful.  A few members.  
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A good dash of rhetoric, occasional brilliant insight.  But nothing has 
happened.”173 
After the convention, SDS began to issue a membership bulletin in order to 
widen SDS influence, to connect close ties with the chapters, and to make an open 
discussion of the ‘living’ document.  Instantly, two serious projects were also put 
forth: SDS University Reform Project and Peace Research and Education Project.  
The SDS University Reform Project aimed to stimulate “basic research and 
discussion by students on the present nature of university education in America” 
including the topics such as “the role of University in society, the impact of the 
Cold War on the University and the potential of the University to act as an agent of 
social change.”174  
Peace Research and Education Project mainly aimed to influence the policy 
makers, to improve their ability “to cope with world problems without the use of 
violence.”175   But this was a hard task.  Thus, in practice, the project was more 
intended to such issues as to direct students’ “research interests and educational 
efforts toward the problems of peace.”  It also sought for “improving the 
intellectual and technical competence of peace activists” and a “reform of 
university curricula toward education on peace problems.”176  The Peace Research 
and Education Project proved to be the most successful project of SDS.  This was 
mainly due to the fact that there was a great appeal for a peace movement both 
among students and other dissident groups.  What it called for was clear and was 
open to some other sections of the American society.  The success was in terms of 
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stimulating an activism, which was relatively easier to achieve.  Even in 1965, 
when The Peace Research and Action Project became dominant by organizing the 
Vietnam protests, it still neither aimed at revolutionary social reform, nor targeted 
some deeply rooted paradoxes of the American society. 
However, University Reform Project, which aimed at long-term 
achievements in comparison to PREP, had no suitable circumstances to advance.  
Al Haber argued that the main problem was its vague conception.   In fact, “the 
series of mailings and conferences it was to produce would clarify its direction.”177  
But they were never held.  Haber, with another SDS member called Barbara 
Jacobs, argued in a letter to SDS members that the project would collapse due to 
the deficiencies within a much more fundamental issue; that was SDS organizing 
policy: 
We believe that it is foolish for us to expect to have a 
voice in remote local activity unless there are SDS people on the 
local scene to give our ideas visibility and to push the services of 
a central SDS office.  Here, again, the project emphasis must 
shift to local organization, around which to focus our intellectual 
program.178 
 
What Al Haber and Barbara Jacobs cautioned against was the attitude of the 
national staff, most of whom defined the problems of SDS as caused by the 
deficiencies of the center.  There was a potential among the students to become 
SDS members, but SDS still didn’t have a program that was directed to local 
organization.  The task concluded at the Port Huron Convention was “to transform 
SDS from a circle of friends into a membership organization.”179  But without the 
energies directed to the issues of local organization, membership communication, 
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and fundraising, SDS would continue to remain as a leadership organization rather 
than a membership organization, as Haber and Jacobs wrote to the SDS members: 
  What was the National Council supposed to do?  It was to 
put organizational responsibility in the hands of chapters and 
associated group people—So that our program thinking might 
represent the real needs of the local scene… It was to include 
observers from the numerous non-SDS but friendly groups 
around the country, as well as fraternal delegates from national 
and regional organizations.  It was to invite people from the 
publications, student and adult, with whom we are friendly or to 
which we look for significant view.  
… (But) it didn’t occupy prominence in general 
correspondence, there was no focusing or chapter and local 
attention to it, and to our knowledge there were no special 
invitations sent out.180 
 
However, even fundraising was in itself a serious problem.  At the time, SDS 
had even no “sufficient funds to keep a stock of Port Huron Statements on hand for 
use at conferences and on local campuses.”181  There was no support from the 
members to get work done.  The so-called parent body LID was “near broke, even 
minimal operating funds have been non-existent or only infrequently available”182 
from it.  The only project getting some support was PREP.  But for the national 
staff, the main reason for this was a lack of initiative.  Haber argued that there were 
people, mainly adult small contributors who were both willing and able to make 
support.  But again there was a lack of effective communication, which led to the 
fact that SDS could not express its needs to those adult sponsors.  For instance, 
“project proposals were not written up and sent to foundations.”183  The same 
situation existed on the issue of chapters and local organizing.  The national staff 
clarified it in a letter to SDS members in the late 1962: 
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Too often national officers and national meetings blame 
lack of financial stability for our inability to organize.  Rather, 
the opposite is true, we suspect: we cannot raise money because 
we do not have chapters doing things.  Chapters can be started 
with little or no local money and a minimum resource help from 
the national office—mostly literature.  What is needed is an 
investment of time and effort on the part of individual SDS 
members. We must get into our communities—whether those be 
the student bodies, particular areas of cities, work groups, or 
whatever—to promulgate ideas and stimulate action184  
 
Yet, for the national staff, what SDS needed most was to open the way for 
the local supply.  Adult sponsors and organizational business could not be 
permanent sponsors.  For a long term SDS activity, it was necessary to have 
serious local organizing not only because it had to be membership oriented, but 
also because that was the only way to get permanent financial support.    
Haber’s proposition, which argued that SDS was in isolation, and thus, there 
were no serious works or projects carried out, and there was no permanent 
financial support, was shared by most of the other members.  But there was 
disagreement on the solution.  Haber believed that, about the problem, he finally 
settled the proper question “that the basic unit of the organization was to be the 
local chapter or associated group.”185  In the mind of Haber, local chapters meant a 
constituency on the campus, and the problems of membership meant simply the 
problems of campus organizing.  From the beginning, Haber conceived SDS as a 
campus based organization with the primary aim of rendering the dissident groups 
and students with significant intellectual development.  Student activism would 
have to be the result of an intellectual workforce, and not a result of spontaneous 
outrage.  The latter choice would result with a waste of energy: 
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In fact our intellectual workforce has been expanded little 
in the fall.  We don’t set up functioning advisory boards and do 
not try to convince people with research in progress to direct 
their expertise in terms of our various strategic conceptions.  The 
schemes we design as political theorists and activists, fall on us 
also to implement as scholars, researchers and educators.  We 
can’t do both; we don’t have time for both; and we can’t be good, 
simultaneously, at both.186 
 
Although Haber and Jacobs reminded SDS members that their assertion was 
“not to press for a back-to-campus-let’s-educate-the-sophomores approach,”187 it 
stressed that the two distinct tendencies rooted within SDS became apparent.  
Some SDS members believed that, in America, the class struggles of the 1930s did 
not cease at all, but were “diverted into new, unexplored channels, with completely 
new forms and effects.”188  There were still existed “large numbers of Americans” 
who were “composed of minority groups, and the technological unemployed” and 
they constituted “dispossessed economic groups”189 that Michael Harrington told 
in his The Other America.  The technological unemployed were the result of 
“automation, the process of machines replacing men in performing sensory.”190 In 
the Port Huron Statement, it was argued that, together with the post-war 
recessions, this economic situation had severe consequences on citizens:  “five 
million becomes an acceptable unemployment tabulation, and misery, 
uprootedness, and anxiety become the lot of increasing numbers of Americans.”191 
For Hayden what was needed was “a way to transform these invisible 
rebellions into a politics of responsible insurgence rooted in community after 
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community,” by “speaking in comprehensible terms to the felt needs of their 
locales, offering specific alternatives to specific problems of inequality, industrial 
stagnation, inadequate schools, civil defense.”192  This meant that SDS should 
target the individuals outside the campus, developing among the poor people a 
consciousness of political dissent.   
Thus, Haber was right in complaining that there was not yet a consensus on 
what it meant to be SDS member in terms of vision.  It was apparent that there was 
not a single, operating vision of SDS that was approved among the national staff 
and prominent members.  While he rushed for creating “a real confederation of 
campus and community based radicals” to achieve a national new left organizing, 
there were some others who thought rather differently.  Paul Booth, a prominent 
SDS member at the time, offered to “avoid permanent reform in the mechanics of 
the system,” which Haber planned to achieve with his Professionals and Social 
Change Project.193  Booth asserted that to encourage permanent citizen 
participation in the body politic among the potentially dissident groups was the 
surest way for social reform.  His political reform proposal offered to imitate 
southern activism: 
The realignment of the sixties and seventies will displace 
Dixiecrats from political control of their political fiefs through 
militant organization, registration, and the use of political power 
of the organized vote.  The civil rights movement will, with other 
liberal forces in the South, force the Dixiecrats into the national 
conservative (Republican) party, and the force of the organized 
vote (the political scientists will call the civil rights movement a 
‘pressure group’) will be the mechanism.194 
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The underlying assumption in Booth’s proposal was that the white poor and 
white students were not faced with such a problem as voter registration, and thus, 
they would have no difficulty in following the patterns of southern activism.  To a 
certain degree, Hayden shared Booth’s beliefs.  Explicitly, he was against Haber’s 
vision.  For Hayden, SDS had already achieved enough organizational power to 
cope with the current situation of American politics.  The activist spirit of the 
sixties provided the appropriate circumstances for SDS to involve immediately in 
active politics.  Otherwise, the organization would inevitably assign “to a vague 
educational role in society that increasingly (was) built deaf to the sounds of 
protest.”195  The most urgent issue to deal was the new Administration’s attempt to 
form a loyal political base in the large cities for the future.  Against this, he offered 
to “create genuinely independent political constituencies who (would) not be 
satisfied with the New Frontier.”196  This required directing the organization’s 
energies to off-campus people and to apply the methods of SNCC.  Haber thought 
that this was a self delusion and was to give SDS a practical direction “without a 
visible base” which would make the organization’s “strategic conceptions manifest 
on the local level.”197  SDS members simply tended “to ride the action work of 
others” rather than to “serve as initiators or as effective educators within the action 
framework set by others.”198 
These discussions intensified in the beginning of 1964, when the Economic 
and Research Action Project (ERAP) was proposed.  There emerged two truly 
distinct camps within SDS on the question of on-campus versus off-campus 
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activity.  It was a time for a serious decision among the two options.  The decision 
was crucial because it would determine where to spend the limited energy and 
money SDS had.  As a consequence, ERAP project was initiated.  Hayden was 
among the defenders of the project and in this crucial decision; his influence was 
again a decisive factor.     
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
ERAP effect on SDS 
 
During the period from late 1963 to 1964, SDS went through a crucial 
development and clarified its vision.  This development involved a visible shift 
from some of the early SDS objectives.  This shift can be formulated with the 
content of an actual debate that took on within the organization and pervaded the 
whole aforementioned period.  This shift signifies the most crucial process that 
SDS has undergone in its history.  Much of the later disappointments on the 
organizational nature of students were the result of the decisions taken during this 
debate.   In general terms, the main issue of the debate was to choose between on-
campus and off-campus organizing as the priority of SDS.  But more specifically 
and implicitly, the concern of the debate was a vital dilemma: to what degree SDS 
would be an organization with a loose organizational structure.  This dilemma was 
closely related with the application of participatory democracy within SDS groups, 
which in a sense required a loose structure.  For Al Haber, SDS needed disciplined 
and continuous communicational bonds between the national office and all the 
local chapters.  This also required a harmony between these bases in terms of both 
vision and course of action until SDS succeeded in its educational objectives. As 
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the mood of off-campus organizing highlighted the experimental approaches such 
as practicing the participatory democracy, many members turned away from 
dealing with the task of creation of a reformist structure within educational 
institutions and professional areas. The only mutual concern among the students 
became the values and some immediate issues like peace protests, direct action 
against discrimination, and organizing the poor around economic issues.   
The on-campus versus off-campus debate had been held theoretically from 
the earliest stages of SDS.  But when the Economic Research and Action Project 
was proposed in September, 1963, and found a wide support from most of the 
newly recruited members, SDS came to a turning point in terms of its course of 
practice.  Originally ERAP was introduced as an educational organization to teach 
to the college people radical economics and trade union principles in order to 
render them with a radical vision on American economic system.  Soon after, its 
direction was totally changed when Hayden and Carl Witmann proposed that an 
interracial community organizing among poor whites and blacks would be the 
priority of ERAP.  ERAP was in a sense a reply to Haber’s call for serious projects 
and proposals but the vision behind it was totally opposite to his approach.  With 
Haber, some other SDS members felt a disappointment as ERAP began to 
dominate SDS.  The main problem was that ERAP mainly “attracted activists 
whose main priority was not the health and viability of national SDS, or any 
national organization.”199  Worst of all, some of the most influential and effective 
figures within the SDS had a similar mood. 
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The next SDS convention after Port Huron was held on June 15, 1963 in Pine 
Hill, New York.  The importance of the conference was that there emerged an 
alternative manifesto to the Port Huron Statement.  Its title was “America and the 
New Era” and written by Dick Flacks, an important SDS member who had a 
primary role in initiating ERAP.  “America and the New Era” was a reflection of 
emerging of a new concern and vision among some SDS members.  Most of the 
issues and the context described in this new manifesto were similar to the ones in 
the Port Huron Statement.  The remarkable difference was that the new document 
argued that the movement should embrace other sections of the society.  The 
agents of social change should not be only the students.  The circumstances of the 
Cold War period proved that the ordinary people, especially the poor and the 
unemployed masses should take the initiative in making social reform.  The main 
issue was “the technological revolution occurring in the post-war period,” which 
“created a new type of automated production.”200  This caused that the “the need 
for workers was being reduced,” and the problems it created were increased by a 
“radical increase in the number of people needing jobs as taking place, due to the 
coming of age of millions of young people born during the war-time baby 
boom.”201  Then, the immediate problem within throughout the country was 
unemployment.  But the immediate problem of SDS was not only the 
unemployment, but also the New Frontier program initiated the Kennedy 
Administration in order to cope with the unemployment.  In the document, the 
New Frontier was criticized as trying to retain the status quo: 
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This, then, is the essential shape of the Establishment as it 
strives to respond to the new era—it intends to be rational, active, 
and adaptive, but its policies and style flow from its necessary 
commitment to the preservation of the going system.202 
  
The implicit worry about the New Frontier was that it would become 
dominant and would marginalize the movement.  As some SDS members thought, 
the New Frontier was in a sense a response to the increasingly strengthening social 
movements of the sixties, and aimed to keep other sections of the society away 
from them, a strategy which was thought to diminish the power of the movement 
as a whole and to highlight the status quo against the demands for genuine 
democracy.  The solution was that SDS should concentrate on the issue of poverty 
and unemployment with the aim of radicalizing those people.  The document warns 
that the New Frontier would satisfy some of the immediate demands of the poor, 
but as a consequence, would end the possibilities of healthy reform: 
When consensus is manipulated, when reform emanates 
from the top while active movements for change are described, 
then the process of democratic participation has been defeated.  
In the short run, efforts to dampen social conflict and prevent 
popular upsurge limit drastically the possibilities for real reform 
and innovation in the society.  In the long run, the encroachment 
of the engineered consensus will permanently frustrate the long 
human struggle to establish a genuinely democratic 
community.203  
    
Actually, ERAP was the result of this statement.  ERAP was not a simple 
project that solely aimed to develop living standards of the poor.  There were 
diverse motives behind ERAP.  Most of these determining factors were formulated 
by Hayden in the pamphlet “An Interracial Movement of the Poor?” which he 
wrote with Carl Wittman and issued in 1963.  The importance of this document 
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was that it reshaped the ERAP, clarified its motives, its aims and the causes of its 
urgency.  Apart from the New Frontier’s implications, there was a significant 
caution in the document about the ongoing situation of movement, which justified 
immediate action on organizing an interracial cooperation between the black and 
white poor: there was “a kind of black nationalism”204 arising within the 
movement, especially among the unemployed black people where “the automation 
of traditional low-skill work (caused) the greater isolation of the ghetto-dwelling 
Negro from the world of white people.”205  As the racial militancy of the black 
movement grew, it began “dividing the traditional Negro-labor-white-liberal 
coalition, particularly in Northern cities.”206  This was a serious danger to the 
movement, and in this sense, one of the motives behind ERAP was the urgent need 
to stop this situation. 
At the time, there was an organized struggle against poverty and 
unemployment among the blacks.  However, on the part of the poor whites, there 
was an alienation and apathy, which “was subordinate to a common interest which 
happened to be central to the lives of black and white factory workers.”207  But 
there was on the other hand a potential for cooperation.  Carl Wittman witnessed a 
coalition between blacks and students in Chester, Pennsylvania, that would gave 
the inspiration for ERAP direction:   
  In the fall, the local Youth Chapter of the NAACP had 
begun to organize pickets, marches and petitions in conjunction 
with students from Swarthmore.  They acted in support of a 
thirty-seven-point of platform, which included demands for fair 
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and full employment, new housing, new schools, and fair police 
practices.  In November, more than 200 Chester blacks and 50 
students were arrested at demonstrations before the city agreed to 
meet some of their demands and drop charges against protesters.  
In the aftermath, several militant neighborhood organizations 
were established, again with the help of students.208 
 
By basing their argument on this example, Hayden and Wittman thought 
that, to define common interests would unite the poor blacks and poor whites.  This 
common interest was that both sides had marginal or insecure economic roles in 
the society.  The 1963 National Convention was decisive in choosing this ERAP 
direction.  Yet there was no more than a few proposals on the project.  But there 
was clearly a new mood; a new enthusiasm nourished by the sense of going 
through real work outside the campus.  There was a steadily growing appeal for 
ERAP among the students and this appeal was mainly caused by that sense. 
Apart from political concerns, ERAP was also a result of an overstatement 
about the potentials of the organization on one hand and the result of a need to 
prove to the other communities that SDS was a living, active organization. At the 
end of 1963 there was a widespread recognition of SDS among both the other 
radical organizations and liberal groups.  But as the new president of SDS, Todd 
Gitlin explained, the organization was yet identified solely with its leadership and 
this caused the fact that, the identity of SDS officers was better known than what 
they did; and this was true even among the remote members.  This was mainly due 
to a lack of serious and comprehensive projects, as Haber all the time stressed.  But 
Haber’s main concern was that the need for projects was due to a need to create 
close ties among the members.  But to Gitlin, projects were needed because SDS 
members were often hard pressed by the other groups to explain exactly what they 
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were doing.  There was clearly a pressure on the SDS from the other dissident 
organizations:  the recognition and support was conditional, and SDS had to 
contribute seriously to the ongoing activist movement.  In this sense, Gitlin warned 
in his report in February 1964 that SDS should immediately create a genuine 
contribution in terms of activism in order to explain to the others what SDS meant: 
 Not our conception of the movement, not a scheme for 
social change, not an ideology of participatory democracy, not a 
group of intellectuals gifted with the perception that certain 
social issues connect with each other, but what activities, present 
and projected, are specifically and uniquely those of SDS.209 
 
1963 was the year that SDS triumphed dramatically on the issue of 
attendance and participation.  In December, 1963, there were 25 chapters with over 
725 dues-paying members.  As the organization grew rapidly, there inevitably 
began close interactions with liberal and radical communities.  Most of the new 
members had ties with other groups and therefore there was an influence.  But 
most importantly, those members took their involvement in those other groups 
more seriously than their involvement in SDS. This was due to the fact that SDS 
was not an activist organization yet.  Most of the old staff was aware of the fact 
that there was a great potential of membership due to the influence of the Port 
Huron Statement.  But to take an active direction was necessary in order to keep 
the members and benefit from this potential.  The national secretary Lee Webb 
pointed out this situation in his report in December 1963: 
 I want SDS to be an organization that is an initiator of 
the intellectual and action projects that have been the most 
successful aspects of our organization.  For too long, we have 
been a parasite on the more active organizations, i.e. SNCC and 
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NSM.  Thus, many of our members when they want action either 
leave SDS, or at least work in another organization.210 
 
In this context, what SDS should do was obvious: to create its own peculiar 
national action project.  Like Hayden and Wittman, Webb pointed out that it was 
quite possible to organize the black and white community for a single cause.  The 
cause was economic empowerment, the project was ERAP, and the role of SDS 
was to be the catalytic force.  Webb significantly pointed out that no other group 
was doing this urgent job.     
This enthusiasm and excitement for the redefined ERAP project 
overwhelmed the SDS National Council that met in December, 1963, in New York 
City.  This meeting was a turning point: the divisions inherent within the 
organization finally sharpened at this meeting.  This led to an intense debate and 
struggle on the direction of SDS.  The main concern was to determine whether 
SDS would be an on-campus organization stressing a long-termed educational 
nature or an off-campus organization that would deal with the immediate political 
and economic issues concerning not only the students but the whole society.  An 
off-campus organization meant also that SDS would be a loose organization 
embracing the activist masses and therefore its primary role would be to become a 
catalytic force.  ERAP was the means to achieve this notion. Therefore, it was the 
primary task of the off-campus defenders and in this way it was the center of 
discussion.  On-camps defenders argued that ERAP brought with it the danger that 
within this notion SDS would loose its identity.  This issue was the chief dilemma 
of SDS.  It was more or less inherent within the organization from the earliest 
stages; it particularly emerged when Hayden began to take full participation in 
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SDS and continued up to the 1965-66 period.  In 1965, it came to a final 
conclusion, but not suddenly. The events and the mood of the 1963-64 period 
explicitly expressed that SDS would be an off-campus organization.  During this 
period, there was a great appeal for this among both the new members and a large 
portion of the old members and leaders.  In 1965 most of the members clearly 
announced that they favored participating in off-campus issues: 
Dickie Magidoff, an SDS activist, laid out the choices 
facing SDS.  He said that they could choose to see SDS as the 
growing manifestation of the movement or as something much 
larger that was molded in different ways at the local levels on 
which it operated.  If the first alternative were the case, then 
organizational questions were paramount and SDS should make 
every effort to formalize, integrate and deal with these questions.  
Magidoff found the second alternative more attractive because it 
emphasized the most exciting part of the movement, its local 
dynamism, creativity and diversity…. He acknowledged, too, 
that the first alternative was more challenging because it required 
discipline if they were to “build a conscious left in this 
country.”211 
 
Magidoff’s account clearly reflects the mood of the SDS members during the 
period.  What they wanted was immediate active participation in politics of the real 
world, and to instantly prove themselves that they were changing something within 
the American society and American politics.  This without doubt was an emotional 
attitude, they were mostly angry, but it turned into a hope as the movement 
provided them the possibility to change something.  The main influence of SDS on 
them was not that they would be radicals, but that SDS made them “excited by the 
idea of toppling the American society.”212  
One of the most important facts that made that National Council Meeting 
important was that the discussions on ERAP led to a reconsideration of the 
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existence of SDS.  As far as SDS went on to be a nationally centered organization 
ignoring many of the social problems at the local level, this would alienate many of 
the fresh members who sought for action.  Many of the ERAP defenders would 
soon argue that ERAP should be an independent organization leaving SDS on its 
own.  Consequently many of the ERAP defenders imposed to the others two main 
lines about the future of SDS:  Either SDS would be a loose structural organization 
connecting itself with urgent problems of the whole people on the local level and 
thus give up its radical concerns, or otherwise ERAP defenders would disconnect 
ERAP from SDS.  The debate went on during the 1963-64 school year and finally 
ended with the 1965 SDS National Convention. 
The National Council Meeting was important not only because it was the 
actual starting point of this intense discussion, but at the meeting there also 
occurred a redistribution of power and influence on the part of the prominent 
figures.  Until the meeting Al Haber was the ERAP director.  However, as the 
nature of the project began to alarm him, he took an offensive attitude against the 
project.  But he was oppressed by the group led by Hayden, which was intensely 
supported by most of the new members who were excited by the idea of taking real 
political action thanks to ERAP.  Consequently Haber had to leave his ERAP 
directorship position to Rennie Davis who was a fervent ERAP defender.  The 
implicit struggle between Haber and Hayden was finally concluded in favor of 
Hayden.  Haber, who had been a permanent alternative to Hayden’s visions, lost 
much of his influence and was about to leave the stage just like Harrington:   
For Haber, it was a painful moment.  The organization 
that he had nursed to strength had spurned his advice.  It was 
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embarking on a new course of action that would inevitably leave 
him behind.213 
  
The general mood after the meeting was enthusiasm.  A celebration of the 
initiation of ERAP dominated aftermath of the meeting. During the 1963-64 school 
years, the number of SDS members doubled.  In “A Short History of ERAP” 
Richard Rothstein reflected much of this new mood: 
The history of ERAP has been one of the most exciting 
annals of our movement.  Constantly forced to revise strategy, 
constantly learning from the ghetto residents who really know 
what they need, ERAP organizers have been among the few in 
SDS who have tested theories of ‘participatory democracy’ in 
reality.214 
  
For Rothstein, the importance lay in the fact that “the chief virtue of SDS in 
the last two years” had been “its insistence on relevance.”215  This was certainly a 
justification of the new direction.  However, on the issue of recruitment and 
attendance, there was no need for a justification.  No matter what the significance 
of ERAP was, there was a wide appeal among students.  What this interest 
reflected was their search for authenticity and direct action on the political and 
social issues of the nation.  Leaving the sterile campus atmosphere, and by 
committing themselves to community organizing among the poor, they “gladly 
lived at below subsistence conditions, working day and night at organizing.”216  
From the same point of view, community organizing among the poor was an 
ethical action, which fulfilled the students’ need to practically embrace the values.  
Hayden pointed out that “the ERAP spirit was one of voluntary poverty and simple 
living” for it was not possible to organize poor people “without living on their 
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economic level in their neighborhood.”217  Sharing shelters and meals was a 
common habit among the ERAP volunteers. 
In February 1964, the SDS president Todd Gitlin implied that community 
work among poor was a natural part of SDS organization.  A departure from the 
campus was clearly the dominant trend among students, a trend that would 
determine the future direction of SDS.  However Gitlin thought that SDS was still 
a student organization and what the new trend implied was that SDS was going to 
be a monolithic student organization.  The problem of SDS was not to decide 
between on-campus and off-campus organization any more.  But it was rather 
“how to do real work outside the campus while maintaining educational and 
programmatic liaison with the campus.”218  Gitlin was clearly a bridge between the 
two camps.  He argued that the two separate visions could be reconciled or could 
be pursued together: 
The hope is that a new variety of ‘radical vocation’, of 
off-campus work, will be created: one that requires full time 
dedication similar to that of SNCC field secretaries, yet one in 
which students can participate, if less actively, while still 
regarding the campus as their (temporary) home.219 
  
But Gitlin’s approach didn’t prove to be enough to stop the debate.  Deeply 
disappointed in the National Council Meeting, Haber immediately criticized both 
the ERAP defenders and Gitlin in March 1964: 
 I am highly critical of the substance of such community 
work because it has been without radical direction, clarity of 
goals, or significant differentiation from liberal reform.  And I 
am critical of its organizational role because it diverts us from 
more important things, ignores our role as a student organization 
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and has become the base for an unfortunate anti-intellectualism 
in SDS.220 
  
Haber believed that the ERAP vision was good, but its time was not 
appropriate.  ERAP simply did not embrace the most important issues for the 
organization at the time.  If for Haber the problem was about time, then Rennie 
Davis had a striking response.  In June 1964, in his writing “ERAP Projects: 
Toward an Interracial Movement of the Poor”, Davis cautioned that “without this 
effort to bring poor whites into loose alliance with the Negro freedom movement 
on economic issues,” then the country faced “the alternative of increasing racial 
violence.”221  Clearly such an outcome would undermine SDS along with the 
whole movement no matter what direction SDS had. 
To point out, Haber’s above objection was rhetorical rather than rational.  In 
spotting most of the urgent problems that the movement was about to face, ERAP 
defenders were right.  It also proved that there were serious concerns and clarity 
within their goals.  At the time, the movement was cornered and about to be 
marginalized not only because of the rise black nationalism but also by the policies 
of the administration.  Gitlin warned that the Administration did not “look 
unkindly on that sector of domestic unrest” and it would soon have “its own 
‘community action’ projects, its own ‘year-round work projects.’”222  If those 
programs succeeded, then the movement was marginalized and lost its power: 
 The ‘war on poverty’ is also a ‘war on us’; the glove has 
been cast and the battlefield chosen…. and we cannot fail to join 
the issue.  Radicals cannot.  For if radicals are not participants in 
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mass movements, then assuredly the movements will be co-
opted, or only chaos will result.223 
  
Haber’s objection was not limited to this rhetoric.  His description of the 
mood of the 1963 National Council Meeting gave insights on the alarming 
symptom that SDS possessed with the initialization of its new philosophy and 
direction.  There was almost no one at the meeting that attempted to instill in the 
new members and the staff the possibility of a critical approach to ERAP.  The 
ERAP proposal was not practically opened to debate at all.  This implied a shift 
from the earlier traditions of SDS, which were namely open discussion and full 
participation.  Haber pointed out those crucial issues like “community 
involvement, the leap into the ghetto, a slighting of chapter work and analysis” 
were evaded and “were never seriously questioned.”  Significantly, the National 
Council “simply followed the enthusiasm of its more articulate members.”224  For 
Haber a habit of evading boring issues replaced the notion of full discussion with 
the new SDS.  The community organization did not become the primary concern; it 
actually became the only concern.  Haber argued that this would keep people with 
other talents and interests away from SDS.  But it was mostly the boring issues that 
targeted the real and radical reform. As Haber continuously stated, the first step for 
such a reform was to educate the radicals, because this meant to seed a permanent 
reformist instincts in the people who would later became professionals in key 
positions.  Community organizing was totally unrelated with this primary task.  
According to Haber: 
 The cult of the ghetto has diverted SDS from its primary 
and most difficult task of educating radicals.  It says ‘come and 
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do radical things’.  But when the student decides he has to make 
living, SDS has given him no help in functioning as a radical in 
the middle class, professional world—whence he came, and to 
which, most likely, he will return.225 
 
Jim Williams, a SDS member from the South also pointed out the 
abovementioned dismaying symptom within SDS.  Williams complained that this 
symptom was causing SDS to shift from a mood participatory organization to a 
professional organization.  This was the case in the ERAP:  the old guard was 
defining the programs of the younger group and was imposing upon them their 
projects.  It was not only due to the fact that the old guard within ERAP was so 
much devoted to their cause.  The more important reason was that the younger 
groups, most of which were the new members, were “largely uneducated and ill-
informed and hardly as sophisticated.”226  This kind of organization had been 
clearly rejected in the early stages of SDS and was the most respected difference 
from the old left.  As Williams warned in May 1964: 
 It is almost a sort of paternalism, which we would resent 
bitterly if it came from the LID, but which we practice ourselves 
without notice.  Meanwhile it leads to the growing alienation of 
the younger groupings.  This could mean that SDS could die in a 
very few years because the younger group lacks upward 
mobility, training, and political perspective.227 
 
Like Haber, Williams complained that the reshaping of the ERAP project 
was made without consulting to the most of the members.  ERAP was originally an 
educational organization that aimed to educate college students on trade union 
practices and economics. Its course was later changed and navigated to community 
action organizing among the poor.  This change was made during the 1963 
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National Council Meeting which ended up by replacing Al Haber.  Williams, 
giving account on what happened, concluded that SDS began to work like a 
professional organization where professional experts took the decision and 
imposed those decisions upon the lower position members. 
However, this was true only in the case of reshaping ERAP project.  After 
ERAP was initiated, SDS structure began to evolve in the opposite way.  The local 
chapters were constructed, and soon after they immediately took autonomous 
courses of action.  At the time there was a great attendance to SDS, but most of the 
members were not known by the national office.  This was because only the dues-
paying members could be recorded and most of the members were not paying their 
dues.  In December, 1964, there were totally 2500 members recorded, but 
regardless of those there was a mass membership behind, who involved heavily on 
issues like community organizing, peace protests, discrimination, etc.  SDS already 
had become the catalyst of a mass movement.  For Paul Potter, SDS president of 
1964-65 term, the potential they had helped to create was “too large to be captured 
completely by a still relatively small self-conscious radical community” and thus 
the movement became “too complicated to be dealt with the old and simple 
exhortation to action.”228  This was not a surprising outcome. By 1962, SDS faced 
a period of rapid, but unbalanced and uncontrolled growth.  The growth was not 
caused from an organizational success; rather it was the outcome of great appeal 
from those whose main concern was a loose, uncommitted activism.  Potter 
proposed that in the case of such mass involvement, SDS had to return taking its 
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educational role that would put “radical alternatives before students”229 who were 
not acting radically.  But educating others entailed that SDS had firstly to educate 
itself. 
The crucial change in the structure of SDS did not result from its becoming 
a mass movement, but rather resulted from the response to that growth.  In July, 
1964, Potter made an important statement about the 1964 National Convention: 
A number of SDS venerable old guard came to the 
Convention feeling secure in the knowledge of the organization’s 
phenomenal growth during the last two years and confident that 
they could step back from the positions of responsibility they had 
held for a number of years.230 
 
Most of the old members intended to leave SDS informally but this was not 
only because they were confident about the organization’s evolution.  Some of 
them believed that SDS had become useless when compared to PREP and ERAP.  
SDS, as a national organization needed close communication between the members 
and leadership.  This was almost impossible where a large sum of membership was 
attained and in this a sense the role of SDS became idling.  Thus, some of the old 
leadership staff proposed to orient “to some new form of adult organization, 
fraternally tied to SDS but operating independently in a number of areas.”231  The 
problem was that the agents of social change were more seen as ERAP and PREP 
than SDS by many of the members.  Thus, as an educational organization, SDS 
lost its influence, and much of its power was captured by ERAP and PREP.  As 
Potter stated, those old leader who concentrated on ERAP also took with 
themselves “a number of the intellectual and organizational functions” that had 
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“clustered around SDS” for a number of years.  On the other hand, the other 
portion of the old guard, who defended SDS as an educational organization, had 
lost much of their influence within the organization.  What remained in SDS was 
“a large number of new and uncommitted people” who saw themselves “as the 
formulators of its programs.”  As an educational centered organization, this marked 
an early dissolution of SDS.  But to put it differently, it marked the inevitable 
change in the structure and navigation.  This was inevitable because SDS was 
“what its members were, and its members were always changing.”232  
Tom Hayden was among those old guard members who wanted to leave SDS 
on its own and to concentrate on an independent ERAP.  He left the national office 
and joined the Newark Chapter of ERAP, which aimed to organize the poor in the 
Clinton Hill section of Newark, New Jersey.  His main concern was to “prove in 
action that an integrationist perspective stressing common economic interests could 
still work.”233  Carl Wittman offered him a place in Newark ERAP Project and 
Hayden accepted with enthusiasm. 
The Newark ERAP Project was initiated in June, 1964, with cooperation 
between SDS, the National Committee for Full Employment (NCFE), and a 
Clinton Hill neighborhood group in Newark.  The project’s name was changed to 
Newark Community Union Project (NCUP).  Financial resources were a board of 
trustees already present in Newark and NCFE who had granted $1000.  The main 
target was to improve the living conditions of the poor, particularly housing. The 
urgent problem was that Clinton Hill Neighborhood was designated as a “blight 
area for destruction” as the city wanted “to replace the houses with a light 
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industrial park.”234  This situation would both “cause inconvenience to residents” 
and “result in less jobs because the new factories would be almost totally 
automated.”235  NCUP members viewed that the urgent issue to deal in this context 
was the problem of housing, while Clinton Hill Neighborhood Association saw the 
problem of unemployment as the priority. 
NCUP was put into practice with “a core group of about 35-50 community 
people, working within a structure of a neighborhood-wide group, six block groups 
and six house-wide tenant councils.”236  NCUP members evaded the main concern 
of the Clinton Hill Neighborhood Association, and concentrated their energies on 
the issue of housing.  The rents were very high and the Housing Commission 
worked by graft.  The situation was about to be worse as many of the poor 
residents would be deprived of their houses after the destruction and would need 
houses to rent.  The urgent need was to diminish the rent prices and to improve the 
services.  Thus the program mainly included rent strikes, and some legal actions 
legalizing and supporting the rent strikes. 
Before arriving in Newark, the main aim of the NCUP members was to 
organize poor blacks and whites under mutual concerns.  This plan was actually 
constructed under the false assumption that “the Clinton Hill neighborhood was 
racially integrated in makeup.”237  But the case was rather different in Clinton Hill: 
“only the eastern, or lower, half of the area could in any sense be called poor—the 
rest was working- and middle-class, mostly Negro also.”238  Whites constituted 
only 10% of the total population, where 85% were blacks and 5% were Puerto 
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Rican.  Thus, in a city where over half of the population were blacks and Puerto 
Rican, there was virtually no white unemployment except one or two areas.  This 
made NCUP members change their plan.  As Hayden later remembered:      
In fact, the whites tended to be middle class and lived on 
the avenues high on the hill, while the blacks were poor and lived 
at the bottom.  The city’s poor whites lived in the East Ward; we 
were in the South.  We decided to stay in Clinton Hill, regardless 
of our being mainly white, and made long-range plans to target 
the East Ward, plans which were ultimately carried out in the late 
sixties.239   
 
Although there was an apparent racial imbalance in the NCUP group, it was 
welcomed by the residents.  Initially, only one of the members was black, and most 
of the members had middle-class origins.  However, both the old members of the 
Neighborhood Council and the newly organized black people accepted these 
members.  In the case of any hostility and attack from some liberal or nationalist 
black groups, “neighborhood people defended the white staff instead of 
capitulating to the race-baiting” of those groups.240  
But to organize the people was a difficult task.  NCUP strategy followed two 
lines: activism and education.  Among the poor black residents there was 
“practically no consciousness of any political motion outside their own lives, 
except for a vague feeling for the southern freedom movement.”241  There was the 
problem of political identification with white activists.  The intimate mood and 
heavy political approach of the activists separated them “clearly from any other 
would-be organizers, missionaries, or social workers these poor had ever seen.”242  
But there was another significant difference; instead of “looking down on them, the 
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activists applied their skills “in a process of ‘looking up,’ searching for answers 
from their experience instead of from experts.”243  Activism followed the pattern of 
rent strikes and small demonstrations.  Soon many of the hosts recognized the 
intimacy and commitment of the white activists and began either to support or to 
take active participation.  By November 1964, approximately 300 people were 
“directly participating in some way” while publicity reached “a clear majority of 
the 25,000 residents of the project area.”244  Educational efforts were concentrated 
on full discussion on the issues such as welfare, schools, unemployment, 
recreation, political coalitions with other groups and other neighborhoods.  But this 
was a difficult task, especially when it was the case with angry an oppressed 
people.  Hayden remembers that “petty, emotional feelings often kept people from 
working together” such as “parental hostility toward lifestyle of young people,… 
or a homeowners’ tendency to blame welfare mothers for their problems.”245  The 
causes of social ill were seen in such individual cases and within the nearest 
scenes.  The educational efforts mainly targeted to change this attitude and to 
develop a community spirit among those people:     
We would encourage one person after another at meetings 
to talk about specific problems until they were all shaking their 
heads in agreement and a system of collective abuse had become 
apparent.  Thus, the first step was in transferring blame from 
oneself to institutions. In addition, through the therapeutic 
experience of speaking out after so many years of voicelessness, 
a sense of pride and ability could begin to grow.  Our work was 
to encourage this process, through which the people we had 
organized became organizers themselves.  Our leadership had to 
be transformed into theirs.246 
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NCUP continued its efforts in Newark until the Newark Riot began on July 
12, 1967.  The police arrested a black cab driver named John Smith on that night.  
His fault was driving the wrong way down a one-way street.  John Smith was 
“badly beaten in the course of the arrest, leaving him with broken ribs and a split 
scalp.”247  Civil rights leaders soon heard of the arrest and beating and immediately 
came to the police office demanding that he should be taken to hospital.  This was 
a routine event in Newark, where the policemen, mostly of Irish and Italian descent 
had been regularly chasing blacks with violent means.  This time, however it was 
not only the civil rights leaders who became involved in the case.  An angry crowd 
of blacks assembled in front of the office.  As no dissolution was achieved, 
thousands of people, objecting harshly to the compromising mood of the civil 
rights leaders, began a riot that night.  By “ripping iron bars off storefronts, 
smashing windows, and loading their arms with tape recorders, toasters, 
televisions, clothing, and bottles of liquor,”248 the ghetto crowd responded to the 
oppression they had been facing for a long time in the city.  However, there was 
even no one injured and there was no fight.  After 48 hours of looting, New Jersey 
Governor Richard Hughes came to Newark “with four thousand virtually all-white 
National Guardsmen and five hundred state troopers to relieve Newark’s thirteen 
hundred police.”249  A violent repressing of rioters resulted with 23 people dead, 
725 people injured, and 1500 people arrested.   
The events proved that a new climax of a movement among blacks was 
emerging.  The civil rights movement achieved nothing even on the part of 
jurisdiction: white authorities were still killing the blacks for stealing the property, 
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violently punishing any attempts of rebellion.  The Newark Riot was clearly a 
response to the uselessness of the nonviolent tactics in an urban ghetto situation.  
During 1967, the civil rights movement rapidly lost its influence and left the stage 
to militant black power.  As its fate had been heavily determined by the influence 
of the civil rights movement, community organizing efforts in Newark all 
collapsed: 
The explosive days of July exhausted the dreams of the 
early sixties and climaxed the period of NCUP’s vitality.  
Traditional arrangements in the city were nullified by the 
upheaval.  The new period would be symbolized by the cry of 
“black power.”  This rising nationalism, already stirring before 
the events of July, took on irreversible strength after the 
bloodshed.  The crisis had revealed a nearly universal white 
apathy to black fate.  The days were winding down when 
credible blacks would be able to work closely with whites as 
partners in common cause.  A resurgence of separatism, always 
present in black history, was becoming the foreboding alternative 
to interracial alliances.250  
 
However, NCUP efforts in Newark did not prove to be useless at all.  
Certainly a redistribution of power to the poor was not achieved.  A certain sense 
of community spirit was achieved although among a very few people.  A few 
accomplishments occurred as a result of the pressure upon slumlords, city 
inspectors, the welfare office, judges, police, and City Council members.  Some of 
them were fired from their offices as a result of abuse, uncovered by the NCUP.  
The most important success was the election of Kenneth Gibson as mayor—the 
first black mayor of Newark.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Students for a Democratic Society was formed as an educational organization 
in 1959 as the youth chapter of LID.  The main concern was to educate college 
students in order to make them sophisticated radicals.  With this approach Al 
Haber—the founder of SDS—hoped to influence a majority of students who would 
later become middle-class professionals in various key positions.  The social 
reform, which SDS sought, would emerge when most of those positions were filled 
with radical and reformist professionals.  In this perspective, the students were not 
the agents for social change.  They were the professionals who would make the 
reform and students were important as far as they would later become 
professionals.  The goal that the founders of SDS strived after was a radical social 
reform; the key concept of this radical reform was the extension of democratic 
values and institutions.  Some socialist concerns were also inherent in SDS from 
the very beginning.  On-campus organizing was the key strategy and collectivism 
was an inseparable part of both on-campus organizing and community organizing 
outside the campus.   
In making SDS an effective organization, what Haber relied on was the 
potential of students to become serious and committed radicals.  Many of the 
students were restless, and they were bored as the result of the affluent but 
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automated way of life during the Cold War era.  Many of them were in search of 
any kind of authentic purpose that would give a meaning to their lives.  There was 
a critical approach among some of them to the problems of the nation as a result of 
this restlessness.  Haber’s purpose was to make them full time radicals dedicated to 
the particular purpose of “reform from within.”  This purpose was quite different 
from the current activities of the influential civil rights movement.        
But in the course of its development period, SDS did not follow the line that 
Al Haber proposed.  Haber created close relations with SNCC and some competent 
individuals already active within the movement.  His plan was to recruit new 
members and some influential figures that would be useful in improving SDS.  
However this plan soon haunted him because the recruited members brought with 
them quite different visions.  When new members who defended direct action 
came, Haber’s ideas were marginalized within SDS.  The loose leadership structure 
of the organization prevented him from overpowering the new visions:  SDS was 
principally open to full discussion among all the members; the notion of leadership 
was quite different from the older tradition.  Voting was replaced with collective 
decision making.  The role of the leadership was limited to organizing. 
Tom Hayden’s recruitment was the decisive factor in changing SDS 
direction.  He was a key factor in gathering people around SDS, and this was the 
reason why Haber insisted on recruiting him.  But Hayden’s concern was far from 
Haber’s idea of creating an effective, long term educational organization.  What he 
attempted to do was to invoke in the powerless groups the sense of participatory 
democracy and leave them with their own leadership.  One of the aims of ERAP 
was this purpose.  In this sense, Hayden’s concern was to experiment with 
participatory democracy and he urgently took this mission. Thus, it can be said that 
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the notion of immediate participatory democracy prevented other serious SDS 
notions to be put into practice.   
More significantly, Hayden’s influence also included the SNCC notion, 
which was direct and immediate activism against segregation and racism.  His 
influence by SNCC was a key factor both in turning SDS into a mass movement 
and rendering it a new direction other than an educational one.  With Hayden, SDS 
focused to influence not only the students, but also all the ordinary people.  By 
community organizing he tried to affect the political and social structure from the 
bottom up.  Participatory democracy aimed to enable people to make their own 
decisions and to take back the power from the so-called Military-Industrial 
Complex: 
I think that by focusing the movement on the 
monopolized decision making in the country, everywhere, you 
get at the heart of the problem.  You also begin to build a new 
identity for people who are in the movement.251  
 
Hayden’s central concern shifted to ERAP from SDS.  Soon ERAP gained an 
independence from SDS and aimed to become a more comprehensive organization.  
ERAP organizers like Richard Rothstein offered a new vision in which “the Peace 
Research and Education Project could easily become separate but overlapping 
forms open to students as well as ‘adults’ while still keeping a working connection 
to an SDS student-centered program.”252 
Taking the initiative on their own, ERAP organizers redefined the 
movement.  It became a movement of interracial community organizing among the 
poor, leaving SDS with its own fate.  The notion of education was still important 
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but it should be met “within the active fibers of the movement itself.”253  ERAP 
resulted in the fact that most of the effective and brilliant SDS members left SDS 
to focus on direct activism and community organizing issues.  This was more like 
SNCC than SDS.  In SDS, when the old talented staff disconnected itself and left 
its place to new and unqualified members, SDS faced an informal dissolution after 
1964.  Most of these members also celebrated ERAP, it was attractive to the 
activists and was a genuinely radicalizing experience.   
No matter what the significance of ERAP was, the wide appeal among 
students reflected their search for authenticity and direct action on the political and 
social issues of the nation.  Leaving the sterile campus atmosphere, and by 
committing themselves to community organizing among the poor, they “gladly 
lived at below subsistence conditions, working day and night at organizing.”254  
This mood was what the new left meant to the many of the young participants; not 
a political analysis but a response to “a cultural and psychological need.”255 
Also, ERAP was an important political experience for those students 
involved in it.  In practice, the bureaucracies in local levels “taught them the need 
to confront, rather than try to reform from within, the controlling institutions of 
American life.”256  But this radicalizing process was no more than to have an 
experience on the conditions of those institutions and on directly and urgently 
confronting them.  ERAP was the reflection of the new SDS attitude:  social 
reform should come immediately from direct action.  
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ERAP was also the reflection of some SDS members’ intention of widening 
their movement.  SDS should be a force which explored for “many of its allies 
within the liberal institutions” and it should “involve cooperative relationships and 
perhaps even mergers with various civil rights, peace, labor, student and other 
groups.”257  Most of those members had coinciding political concerns with such 
other groups, but particularly with the civil rights movement.  These members 
were the majority within SDS, and significantly SDS closely related itself with the 
civil rights groups such as SNCC.  This soon proved that the future of SDS as an 
organization became closely bounded with the destiny of SNCC. 
Tom Hayden was the decisive factor in rendering this navigation to SDS.  
What made him an activist was his concern with SNCC and when he was recruited 
for SDS, he preserved the deep influence he got from the SNCC activists.  His 
main plan in SDS was to apply SNCC methods in the North.  The attitude of 
community organizing was an attempt to apply these non-violent methods based 
on direct action.  There were several factors that helped Hayden to dominate SDS 
and put his vision into action.  Firstly, he was very successful in articulating his 
vision and connecting it with the current concerns of the students—especially 
connecting this vision with the students’ alienation.  Another important thing was 
that there was no strict formal leadership in SDS but there was still a need for a 
leadership.  Due to the lack of strict leadership, there was a lack of initiation in 
organizational issues.  When most of the members were lost in endless theoretical 
debates about what to do, Hayden was an exception; he was an initiator and 
organizer who immediately acted.  In this situation, he became the natural leader.  
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Another factor was that Hayden’s vision was perfectly reflecting the concerns of 
affiliated student masses.  Al Haber was a theorist; he was creating totally new and 
usually difficult strategies for social reform, while what Hayden did was to reshape 
the mutual concerns of those masses and to a degree, to manipulate their ideas. 
Tom Hayden and the defenders of ERAP opened the way for decentralization 
in SDS.  Off-campus organizing dictated to localize all of the chapters, and often to 
include adults in the organization.  Experiments in participatory democracy in 
many chapters brought independence.  The 1965 National Convention was an 
attempt to solve this dilemma.  An off-campus orientation had already been settled 
strongly and what came out in the convention were the questions of the structure 
and the direction of off-campus orientation.  The Convention proved not only that 
SDS as an educational organization with strong communicational network was 
ceasing, but that ERAP was also losing its efficiency and influence.  Most new 
members defended off-campus orientation, but they also heavily pressed for a 
complete dissolution of centralized structure: 
A shared and growing opposition to national structure and 
an emphasis on local initiative was brought in with the new breed 
of recruits and reflected in the politics of the SDS National 
Convention in 1965, the first convention after the anti-war 
demonstration earlier that spring.  The strong assertion of 
participatory democracy and anti-centralism accompanying the 
expansion of the movement is explained by the experience and 
outlook of the newer membership.  They had much less political 
outlook than the older and original members of SDS as most of 
the old guard, with similar politics, had turned their efforts to 
community organizing.258 
 
The main concern of the new members was that they did not want to be 
limited by any projects imposed from the central office.  These demands also 
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included a critical approach against a commitment to ERAP.  The new members 
largely suppressed defenders of centralized organization.  The 1965 National 
Convention proved that a new mood and direction had emerged in SDS.  Paul 
Cowan cautioned that “the overall strategy of decentralization” had been put into 
practice before people “worked out practical means of facilitating it.”259  The 
outgrowth of decentralization in such a way closed effective ways of 
communicating “from one area of the movement to another, or from the movement 
as a whole to the outside the world.”  This, to Cowan, would result in a loss of 
network, which was crucial in creating a strong and determined movement: 
The movements are spread over the entire country and 
encompass many people, few of whom are known to one another.  
Many of the most intelligent people within the movements have 
been too busy acting within their locality to worry about writing 
for a national constituency.260 
 
Cowan was right about his caution, but it was too late to prevent the 
situation.  Even the “unity around ERAP was short-lived.”261  As many of the 
community projects failed, and local initiative took over the decision-making from 
the national level, ERAP chapters became independent projects.  Many of the 
members left ERAP with disappointment and directed their energies to Vietnam 
protests.  In May 1965, hundreds of students “made serious commitments to work 
to end the war in Vietnam, whatever the implications of such a commitment might 
be.”262  1965 was clearly the year of dissolution in the attempt of decentralization: 
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The Winter and Spring of 1965 were crucial to the present 
development of the organization.  It was during this period that 
the notion of a single correct path to social change died, and was 
replaced by the only attitude which a diverse organization can 
adopt and still survive: namely, that anyone can work on what 
interests him and anything goes.263 
 
As the result of the dissolution, the peace movement became the primary 
concern in SDS.  In April 1965, local coordinators for the March on Washington to 
End the War in Vietnam met and there came “a consensus that the guts of a follow-
up program would consist of full-time summer organizing projects.”264  The 
meeting was organized by SDS and as Paul Booth reported, out of the meeting 
SDS would “be able to make some kind of judgment about what kind of energies 
to put into a summer Vietnam program.”265  
Why was ERAP dissolved and why did it lose its dominance to the peace 
issues?  Behind the serious arguments that defended ERAP and community 
organizing stood two important facts.  One was the widening gap between the 
blacks and the lower class whites throughout the country, which began to 
undermine the valuable efforts of SNCC.  Hayden was convinced that “violent 
conflict between Negroes and lower class whites” would not “force the American 
establishment to even make significant concessions.”  Rather he believed that it 
would “ignore the trouble and leave it to the local police,”266 or would violently 
repress the conflict.  Both of the options would result with more anger and 
disappointment among the blacks.  ERAP and community organizing efforts were 
in this sense mainly aimed to preserve SNCC influence in the country by 
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reconciling the blacks and poor whites under a common cause.  Soon, apart from 
the PREP, all efforts and energies of SDS were channeled into this issue.  It was 
with this approach that SDS became deeply bounded to the existence of SNCC.   
The transition of the civil rights movement into black nationalism and the 
transition of nonviolent action into militant action made SDS obsolete.  Apart from 
the peace issues, the power and influence of SDS as a white student movement was 
rooted within the organic ties between SDS and SNCC.  In December 1967, 
“whites were expelled from SNCC by a vote of a nineteen to eighteen, with 
twenty-four abstaining.”267  This meant that whites were not ejected from the 
organization.  Rather, whites tended to leave SNCC.  This was a response to the 
black control arising within SNCC, which pressed for strict structure and militancy 
causing that whites lost their legitimacy.  For Hayden, these whites “could not 
disagree with the demand for black control, but the personal consequences were 
shuttering.”  Most important, “the community, which was their total resource of 
friendship, income, and personal efficacy, was disintegrating.”268  As a 
consequence, “what happened in SNCC reverberated in SDS and in ERAP and 
where organizers gathered to chart their futures.”269  Most of the members sought 
for new identities, some involved in women’s rights movements, some took 
militant action against racism and the others pursued an anti-war movement, 
limiting their radicalism to the end of Vietnam War.  SDS lost its vision and its 
organizational initiative with the loss of these members.  The vacuum was filled by 
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diverse factions until a group with Maoist revolutionary vision based on violence 
took over the organization. 
Tom Hayden continued his activism within the anti-war movements in the 
late sixties and then became involved in environmental and anti-nuclear 
movements in the seventies.  He was elected “to the state Assembly in 1982 and 
the state Senate in 1992, seven consecutive victories on the west side of Los 
Angeles and the San Fernando Valley.”270  
His activism continued during the 90s:  He ran protest campaigns for 
Governor and Mayor of Los Angeles.  In 1994, “he ran protest campaigns with 
virtually no funding for governor, receiving 15 percent of the Democratic primary 
vote; and for mayor of Los Angeles in 1997, winning 35 percent.”271  In 1996, he 
was reelected to the state Senate but was forced to retire in 2000.  Today, he still 
pursues his activism and protest campaigns in his website on the current issues 
such as Iraq War and global justice.  He is also the “national co-director of No 
More Sweatshops!, a coalition of labor, clergy, community and campus advocates 
of ‘sweat-free’ guidelines on public procurement and enforceable labor standards 
for corporate behavior.”272  
In July 2002, Tom Hayden and Dick Flacks issued an article named “The 
Port Huron Statement at 40” giving an account of the relevance of the statement 
for today.  It was argued that the most important legacy of the statement was “the 
fact that it introduced the concept of participatory democracy to popular discourse 
and practice.”273  Today, even a glance at the web would show thousands of 
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references to it.  It also “made sense of the fact that ordinary people were making 
history, and not waiting for parties or traditional organizations.”274  Women’s 
liberation movements and anti-war movements throughout the American history 
have been the instances for this.  As the article declared: 
These participatory practices, which had their roots in the 
town hall, Quaker meetings, anarchist collectives and even 
sensitivity training, are carried on today in grassroots movements 
such as the one against corporate globalization. The strength of 
organizations like the early SDS or SNCC, or today's Seattle-
style direct-action networks, or ACT UP, is catalytic, not 
bureaucratic. They empower the passion of spontaneous, 
communal revolt, continue a few years, succeed in achieving 
reforms and yet have difficulty in becoming institutionalized. 
But while hierarchical mass organizations boast more staying 
power, they have trouble attracting the personal creativity or the 
energy of ordinary people taking back power over their lives. 
Participatory democracy offers a lens for looking at all 
hierarchies critically and not taking them as inevitable. Perhaps 
the two strands--the grassroots radical democratic thrust and the 
need for an organization with a program--can never be fused, but 
neither can one live without the other.275  
 
Today, some of the agenda articulated in The Port Huron Statement was 
achieved: “The cold war is no more, voting rights for blacks and youth have been 
won, and much has changed for the better in the content of university 
curriculums.”276  But today, “the war on terrorism has revived” this agenda 
bringing back the cold war framework, while an “escalating national security state” 
has been preventing the development of civil liberties and social justice.  For 
Hayden and Flacks, the Port Huron Statement has still been alive and significant 
due to this fact:  
To challenge the framework of the war on terrorism, to 
demand a search for real peace with justice, is as difficult today 
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as challenging the cold war was at Port Huron. Yet there is a new 
movement astir in the world, against the inherent violence of 
globalization, corporate rule and fundamentalism, that reminds 
us strongly of the early 1960s. Is history repeating? If so, 
"participatory democracy" and the priorities of Port Huron 
continue to offer clues to building a committed movement 
toward a society responsive to the needs of the vast majority.277 
 
In October 21, 2003, in his “Evidence of Things Unseen: The Rise of a New 
Movement” Hayden announced that a new movement bigger than the movement of 
the 1960s was rising throughout the world based on “the global opposition to the 
war in Iraq and to an American empire”278 with 10 million people demonstrating 
globally.  Even in the case that it would not be successful, Hayden was still 
optimistic, declaring that “we at least will have reached millions more people with 
our message and networking, and we will need that public support in the years 
ahead.”279 
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